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Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation
Abstract
The omnipresence of political misinformation in the today's media environment raises serious concerns about
citizens' ability make fully informed decisions. In response to these concerns, the last few years have seen a
renewed commitment to journalistic and institutional fact-checking. The assumption of these efforts is that
successfully correcting misinformation will prevent it from affecting citizens' attitudes. However, through a
series of experiments, I find that exposure to a piece of negative political information persists in shaping
attitudes even after the information has been successfully discredited. A correction--even when it is fully
believed--does not eliminate the effects of misinformation on attitudes. These lingering attitudinal effects,
which I call "belief echoes," are created even when the misinformation is corrected immediately, arguably the
gold standard of journalistic fact-checking.
Belief echoes can be affective or cognitive. Affective belief echoes are created through a largely unconscious
process in which a piece of negative information has a stronger impact on evaluations than does its correction.
Cognitive belief echoes, on the other hand, are created through a conscious cognitive process during which a
person recognizes that a particular negative claim about a candidate is false, but reasons that its presence
increases the likelihood of other negative information being true. Experimental results suggest that while
affective belief echoes are created across party lines, cognitive belief echoes are more likely when a piece of
misinformation reinforces a person's pre-existing political views.
The existence of belief echoes provide an enormous incentive for politicians to strategically spread false
information with the goal of shaping public opinion on key issues. However, results from two more
experiments show that politicians also suffer consequences for making false claims, an encouraging finding
that has the potential to constrain the behavior of politicians presented with the opportunity to strategically
create belief echoes. While the existence of belief echoes may also provide a disincentive for the media to
engage in serious fact-checking, evidence also suggests that such efforts can also have positive consequences
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Chapter	  1 –	  The	  rising	  concern	  over	  political	  misinformation	  	  	   In	  2011,	  New	  York	  Times	  columnist	  Paul	  Krugman	  predicted	  that	  the	  2012	  Presidential	  campaign	  would	  mark	  the	  nation’s	  entrance	  into	  what	  he	  called	  “post-­‐truth	  politics”	  (Krugman	  2011).	  In	  a	  world	  of	  post-­‐truth	  politics,	  Krugman	  argued,	  politicians	  would	  strategically	  manipulate	  the	  truth	  for	  political	  advantage	  and	  the	  media	  would	  fail	  to	  penalize	  them	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way.	  Krugman	  published	  his	  piece	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  2011	  Republican	  primaries,	  and	  over	  the	  next	  year,	  the	  unfolding	  Presidential	  campaigns	  seemed	  to	  at	  least	  partially	  confirm	  his	  forecast.	  For	  example,	  the	  October	  11	  debate	  between	  Vice-­‐President	  Joseph	  Biden	  and	  Republican	  vice-­‐presidential	  candidate	  Paul	  Ryan	  was	  littered	  with	  dubious	  factual	  claims,	  exaggerations,	  and	  misleading	  statements	  (Gerstein	  &	  Samuelsohn	  2012).	  However,	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  debate	  disproved	  the	  second	  half	  of	  Krugman’s	  prediction.	  Rather	  than	  ignoring	  Biden	  and	  Ryan’s	  falsehoods,	  the	  media	  enthusiastically	  engaged	  in	  fact-­‐checking	  the	  candidates’	  statements.	  The	  








checking	  organizations	  as	  well	  as	  to	  a	  recent	  re-­‐commitment	  by	  journalists	  to	  “shucking	  the	  old	  he-­‐said-­‐she-­‐said	  formulation	  and	  directly	  declaring	  that	  certain	  claims	  are	  false”	  (Graves	  &	  Glaisyer	  2012,	  Bennet	  2012).	  	  Of	  course,	  despite	  the	  renewed	  focus	  on	  fact-­‐checking,	  misinformation	  is	  not	  always	  successfully	  corrected.	  The	  canonical	  example	  of	  uncorrected	  misinformation	  may	  be	  the	  existence	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  in	  Iraq,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  false	  claim	  to	  go	  uncorrected	  for	  weeks	  or	  even	  months	  (Graves	  2012).	  And	  even	  if	  misinformation	  is	  corrected,	  citizens	  may	  not	  always	  accept	  the	  correction.	  For	  example,	  some	  Americans	  continue	  to	  believe	  that	  President	  Obama	  is	  a	  Muslim,	  despite	  the	  overwhelming	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary	  (Nyhan	  2012).	  Finally,	  corrections	  may	  not	  reach	  as	  wide	  of	  an	  audience	  as	  the	  initial	  misinformation.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  possibilities	  in	  more	  detail	  and	  summarize	  scholarly	  work	  on	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  corrections	  might	  fail	  to	  successfully	  debunk	  false	  claims.	  	  	  








In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  present	  evidence	  showing	  that	  this	  assumption	  is	  unfounded.	  I	  find	  that	  exposure	  to	  information	  about	  a	  candidate	  creates	  belief	  
echoes:	  effects	  on	  attitudes	  that	  persist	  even	  after	  the	  claim	  is	  rejected.	  A	  correction—even	  when	  it	  is	  fully	  accepted—only	  reduces	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  attitudinal	  effects	  of	  exposure	  to	  negative	  information.	  An	  L.A.	  Times	  reader	  learning	  about	  the	  “wildly	  inflated”	  cost	  of	  Obama’s	  trip	  to	  India	  might	  come	  away	  certain	  that	  the	  misinformation	  was	  false.	  The	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  suggests	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  her	  dismissal,	  her	  attitude	  towards	  Obama	  would	  be	  more	  negative	  than	  if	  she	  had	  never	  read	  the	  article.	  Belief	  echoes	  suggest	  that	  even	  when	  the	  marketplace	  of	  ideas	  operates	  efficiently	  to	  correct	  false	  claims,	  misinformation	  can	  still	  shape	  citizens’	  attitudes.	   	  	  	  












Chapter	  2 –	  How	  misinformation	  emerges	  and	  is	  corrected	  	  This	  chapter	  first	  defines	  what	  this	  dissertation	  means	  by	  “misinformation”	  and	  outlines	  the	  conditions	  that	  create	  belief	  echoes.	  Belief	  echoes	  are	  created	  when	  misinformation	  is	  successfully	  corrected	  by	  then	  continues	  to	  affect	  attitudes.	  A	  reasonable	  question	  to	  ask	  is	  “how	  often	  does	  this	  actually	  occur?”	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  incentive	  structure	  of	  today’s	  political	  media	  can	  encourage	  the	  successful	  correction	  of	  misinformation.	  Specifically,	  I	  discuss	  (1)	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  misinformation	  can	  emerge,	  (2)	  how	  it	  is	  corrected,	  and	  (3)	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  those	  corrections	  are	  successful.	  I	  review	  existing	  literature	  on	  misinformation	  as	  well	  as	  present	  concrete	  examples	  of	  how	  misinformation	  emerges	  and	  is	  corrected.	  In	  the	  process,	  I	  also	  introduce	  several	  aspects	  of	  misinformation	  and	  corrections	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  amplify	  or	  minimize	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  








manipulations,	  I	  consciously	  focus	  on	  factual	  assertions	  that	  fall	  on	  the	  more	  objective	  side	  of	  this	  spectrum,	  but	  that	  are	  still	  relevant	  to	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  determine	  with	  relative	  (although	  not	  complete)	  certainty	  whether	  a	  candidate	  accepted	  campaign	  donations	  from	  a	  criminal;	  whether	  Barack	  Obama	  was	  born	  in	  the	  United	  States;	  or	  whether	  infant	  mortality	  rates	  rose	  in	  a	  particular	  state.	  While	  these	  claims	  might	  not	  be	  as	  clear-­‐cut	  as	  an	  assertion	  about	  what	  type	  of	  cheese	  John	  Kerry	  ordered	  on	  his	  cheesesteak,	  they	  are	  more	  verifiable	  than	  a	  claim	  about	  how	  John	  Kerry’s	  economic	  plan	  will	  benefit	  the	  middle	  class.	  	  	  
The	  process	  of	  misinformation	  and	  correction	  	   Belief	  echoes	  are	  created	  when	  misinformation	  emerges	  and	  then	  is	  successfully	  corrected.	  To	  understand	  when	  those	  circumstances	  arise,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  outline	  the	  specific	  processes	  leading	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  misinformation	  and	  its	  correction.	  	  Table	  2.1	  The	  prerequisites	  of	  	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  this	  process.	  	  
Table	  2.1	  The	  prerequisites	  of	  belief	  echo	  creation	  	  




Political	  misinformation	  comes	  from	  many	  sources,	  including	  candidates,	  institutions,	  elected	  officials,	  party	  organizations,	  and	  journalists	  themselves.	  Once	  misinformation	  emerges,	  it	  may	  stay	  uncorrected	  for	  hours	  (false	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  2012	  vice-­‐presidential	  debate)	  or	  years	  (weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  in	  the	  Iraq).	  The	  source	  of	  the	  correction	  also	  varies	  widely,	  from	  media	  outlets	  and	  fact-­‐checking	  organizations	  to	  rival	  campaigns	  and	  even	  individual	  citizens.	  	  The	  audience	  of	  any	  given	  correction	  may	  be	  very	  different	  from	  the	  audience	  of	  the	  initial	  misinformation,	  and	  even	  when	  a	  correction	  does	  reach	  its	  intended	  audience,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  fully	  accepted.	  	  Most	  existing	  work	  on	  misinformation	  focuses	  only	  on	  the	  third	  step:	  whether	  –	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  –	  individuals	  accept	  corrections	  of	  misinformation	  (Nyhan	  &	  Reifler	  2010;	  Bullock	  2007;	  Berinsky	  2012).	  However,	  a	  narrow	  preoccupation	  with	  designing	  successful	  corrections	  ignores	  important	  additional	  consequences	  of	  misinformation	  on	  attitudes:	  for	  example,	  the	  creation	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  Understanding	  the	  circumstances	  that	  lead	  to	  belief	  echoes	  requires	  examining	  how	  individuals	  process	  information,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  journalist	  and	  media	  outlets	  make	  decisions	  about	  how	  and	  when	  to	  issue	  corrections.	  Belief	  echoes	  emerge	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  these	  factors.	  	  	  
Emergence	  of	  misinformation	  




on	  misinformation	  that	  is	  pushed	  by	  a	  campaign	  or	  candidate.	  This	  type	  of	  misinformation	  is	  not	  uncommon:	  between	  2010	  and	  2011,	  74%	  of	  the	  statements	  checked	  by	  Politifact	  were	  made	  by	  political	  candidates	  and	  campaign	  organizations	  (Ostermeier	  2011).	  Of	  course,	  Politifact,	  like	  any	  fact-­‐checking	  enterprise,	  chooses	  what	  statements	  to	  examine,	  and	  this	  choice	  comes	  with	  its	  own	  biases.	  Still,	  direct	  quotes	  from	  elected	  officials	  and	  candidates	  are	  a	  mainstay	  of	  political	  news	  (Mindich	  1999),	  and	  as	  such	  are	  frequently	  the	  conduit	  through	  which	  misinformation—deliberate	  or	  not—reaches	  the	  public.	  	  




some	  liberal	  blogs,	  and	  was	  definitively	  corrected	  over	  a	  month	  after	  it	  emerged.	  ABC	  News	  called	  the	  librarian	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  controversy,	  who	  confirmed	  that	  Palin	  never	  requested	  that	  any	  books	  be	  banned	  (Ross	  et	  al	  2008).	  Given	  the	  wide	  variation	  in	  belief	  time,	  ranging	  from	  none	  (for	  example,	  when	  individuals	  first	  encounter	  misinformation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  it	  being	  corrected)	  to	  years,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  belief	  time	  for	  misinformation’s	  effects	  on	  attitudes.	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  of	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false	  claims	  that	  he	  had	  made	  about	  President	  Bush’s	  National	  Guard	  service	  (Jarvis	  2004).	  	  	  The	  public	  may	  also	  play	  an	  indirect	  role	  in	  the	  correction	  of	  misinformation	  by	  encouraging	  the	  media	  to	  take	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  adjudicating	  between	  false	  claims.	  	  For	  example,	  on	  January	  12,	  2012,	  Arthur	  Brisbane,	  the	  public	  editor	  of	  the	  
New	  York	  Times,	  wrote	  a	  column	  that	  generated	  an	  immediate	  and	  overwhelming	  response.	  Brisbane	  posed	  a	  question	  to	  Times	  readers:	  “Should	  the	  Times	  be	  a	  Truth	  Vigilante?”	  (Brisbane	  2012).	  Brisbane’s	  somewhat	  loaded	  term	  was	  meant	  to	  ask	  whether	  Times	  articles	  should	  include	  corrections	  of	  misleading	  statements	  made	  by	  political	  figures.	  Within	  hours,	  visitors	  flooded	  the	  site	  with	  responses.	  The	  vast	  majority	  fully	  supported	  the	  “truth	  vigilante”	  approach	  and	  strongly	  encouraged	  the	  
Times	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  active	  fact-­‐checking	  (Graves	  2012a).	  	  
Where	  the	  correction	  spreads	  Corrections3	  are	  often	  transformed	  into	  news	  stories	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  in	  some	  cases	  reaching	  a	  larger	  audience	  than	  the	  misinformation.	  The	  narrower	  the	  time	  gap	  between	  the	  misinformation	  and	  the	  correction,	  the	  higher	  the	  odds	  that	  any	  given	  consumer	  of	  news	  will	  first	  encounter	  the	  misinformation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  it	  being	  corrected.	  For	  example,	  a	  person	  who	  skipped	  watching	  the	  2012	  vice-­‐presidential	  debate	  might	  wake	  up	  to	  find	  a	  headline	  reading	  “Fact-­‐Checking	  the	  VP	  




Debate”	  in	  her	  morning	  paper.	  This	  trend	  of	  corrections	  as	  stories	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  24-­‐hour	  news	  cycle	  and	  constant	  demand	  for	  new	  content.	  Fact-­‐checking,	  with	  its	  neat	  storyline	  and	  standardized	  format,	  provides	  an	  easy	  way	  for	  media	  outlets	  to	  “fill	  the	  news	  hole,”	  either	  by	  borrowing	  content	  from	  fact-­‐checking	  organizations	  or	  by	  producing	  their	  own	  fact-­‐check	  stories	  and	  segments	  (Graves	  2012b,	  p.	  266).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  normative	  assumptions	  inherent	  in	  this	  development.	  A	  news	  show	  that	  would	  never	  knowingly	  spread	  misinformation	  might	  feel	  quite	  comfortable	  producing	  a	  “fact-­‐check”	  segment	  that	  introduced	  a	  new	  audience	  to	  a	  false	  claim	  made	  in	  a	  speech	  earlier	  that	  day.	  The	  assumption	  motivating	  this	  choice	  is	  that	  because	  the	  claim	  is	  




report	  will	  ever	  see	  a	  bundled	  version	  of	  the	  news	  or	  the	  relevant	  fact-­‐checking	  column,	  which	  could	  have	  been	  published	  months	  earlier”	  (Franke-­‐Ruta	  2012).	  	  	  
Acceptance	  of	  correction	  




weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  in	  Iraq),	  it	  is	  accepted.	  When	  the	  correction	  runs	  counter	  to	  their	  partisan	  attitudes	  (for	  example,	  when	  Republicans	  read	  that	  the	  Bush	  tax	  cuts	  did	  not	  improve	  the	  economy),	  individuals	  retain	  their	  belief	  in	  the	  misinformation.	  Indeed,	  Nyhan	  &	  Reifler	  point	  to	  a	  “backfire”	  effect	  in	  which	  exposure	  to	  a	  correction	  can	  actually	  strengthen	  the	  initial	  belief.	  
	  Correction	  format	  Media	  outlets	  make	  important	  choices	  about	  the	  form	  which	  corrections	  take,	  and	  these	  choices	  inevitably	  impact	  the	  success	  of	  those	  corrections.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  affecting	  whether	  a	  correction	  is	  accepted	  is	  how	  it	  is	  framed.	  Over	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  three	  separate	  approaches	  have	  been	  advocated	  most	  frequently:	  reliance	  on	  external	  institutions	  such	  as	  fact-­‐checking	  institutions,	  a	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  fact-­‐checking	  by	  journalists	  themselves,	  and	  a	  “he-­‐said/she-­‐said”	  approach	  that	  gives	  a	  voice	  to	  both	  sides	  of	  factual	  disputes	  rather	  than	  arbitrating	  between	  them.	  Chapter	  6	  of	  this	  dissertation	  discusses	  this	  debate	  in	  more	  detail	  and	  examines	  how	  it	  might	  affect	  the	  magnitude	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  
	  








Chapter	  3 –	  Belief	  echoes	  and	  the	  role	  of	  delayed	  
versus	  immediate	  corrections	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  modern	  media	  environment	  facilitates	  the	  spread	  of	  both	  misinformation	  and	  corrections.	  The	  assumption	  of	  journalists,	  fact-­‐checkers,	  and	  scholars	  attempting	  to	  design	  more	  effective	  corrections	  is	  that	  once	  misinformation	  has	  been	  successfully	  discredited,	  it	  will	  cease	  to	  affect	  attitudes	  and	  preferences.	  In	  contrast,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  impact	  of	  misinformation	  in	  a	  world	  where	  corrections	  are	  entirely	  successful,	  even	  among	  partisans.	  The	  experiments	  presented	  this	  chapter	  question	  that	  assumption.	  	  	  
















ideologically	  divisive	  political	  issues.	  When	  the	  correction	  challenged	  their	  partisan	  attitudes,	  individuals	  retain	  their	  belief	  in	  the	  misinformation.	  Otherwise,	  the	  correction	  was	  accepted.	  	  The	  tendency	  for	  partisans	  to	  engage	  in	  belief	  persistence	  may	  not	  be	  as	  problematic	  as	  it	  first	  appears.	  From	  a	  normative	  perspective,	  political	  misinformation	  is	  dangerous	  insofar	  as	  it	  leads	  individuals	  to	  make	  political	  evaluations	  and	  judgments	  that	  differ	  from	  those	  that	  they	  would	  have	  made	  if	  they	  were	  correctly	  informed.	  Partisans’	  reluctance	  to	  dismiss	  misinformation	  that	  reinforces	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  attitudes	  is	  a	  different	  phenomenon.	  For	  such	  people,	  the	  misinformation	  is	  not	  shaping	  their	  political	  opinions:	  rather,	  those	  opinions	  are	  shaping	  what	  they	  choose	  to	  accept	  as	  facts.	  	  	  	  	  








It	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  cues	  will	  overwhelm	  any	  potential	  lingering	  effects	  of	  discredited	  misinformation.	  	  Finally,	  experimental	  work	  in	  psychology	  imposes	  a	  delay	  between	  the	  misinformation	  and	  the	  correction,	  giving	  participants	  time	  to	  integrate	  the	  false	  information	  into	  their	  belief	  systems	  before	  it	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  false.	  In	  the	  fast-­‐moving	  political	  world,	  this	  delay	  may	  not	  always	  occur.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  it	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  an	  individual	  may	  first	  be	  exposed	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  misinformation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  it	  being	  corrected.	  	  	  
	  












Table	  3.1.	  Experimental	  Procedure	  	  	  




then	  evaluated	  the	  candidates	  along	  a	  number	  of	  dimensions,	  including	  a	  feeling	  thermometer,	  traits,	  and	  electability	  assessments.	  The	  candidate	  evaluation	  index	  consists	  of	  nine	  variables.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  feeling	  thermometer,	  recorded	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  to	  100.	  Six	  were	  traits,	  also	  measured	  on	  a	  0	  to	  100	  scale:	  shows	  good	  judgment,	  strong	  leader,	  trustworthy,	  dishonest,	  out	  of	  touch,	  and	  selfish.	  Respondents	  also	  answered	  two	  agree-­‐disagree	  statements:	  “John	  McKenna	  would	  make	  a	  good	  representative”	  and	  “John	  McKenna	  may	  not	  be	  suited	  for	  public	  office.”	  The	  electability	  index	  consists	  of	  three	  variables:	  a	  thermometer	  assessing	  respondent’s	  perceptions	  of	  John	  McKenna’s	  appeal	  to	  Independent	  voters,	  a	  question	  asking	  who	  respondents	  thought	  would	  win	  the	  election;	  and	  a	  question	  asking	  whose	  support	  had	  increased	  more	  in	  the	  past	  week.	  The	  full	  questionnaire	  appears	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  shown	  five	  factual	  statements	  about	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  article	  and	  asked	  whether	  each	  one	  was	  true	  or	  false	  (“You	  read	  two	  newspaper	  stories	  about	  an	  ongoing	  Congressional	  race.	  Knowing	  what	  you	  know	  now,	  please	  tell	  us	  which	  of	  these	  statements	  are	  true”).	  One	  of	  these	  statements	  concerned	  the	  misinformation	  (“John	  McKenna	  received	  contributions	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon”)5.	  Participants	  evaluated	  each	  piece	  of	  information	  on	  a	  six-­‐point	  scale	  ranging	  from	  “definitely	  false”	  to	  “definitely	  true.”	  This	  measure	  serves	  two	  purposes.	  First,	  it	  is	  a	  manipulation	  check,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  correction	  was	  read	  and	  processed.	  Second,	  and	  critically	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes,	  it	  confirms	  that	  the	  correction	  was	  successful.	  Full	  acceptance	  of	  the	  




correction	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  eliminates	  a	  key	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  an	  observed	  effect	  of	  the	  corrected	  misinformation	  on	  attitudes:	  skepticism	  of	  the	  correction.	  	  




was	  issued,	  the	  fact-­‐checking	  organization	  Politifact	  declared	  the	  accusation	  false	  (Politifact	  2012).	  	  Because	  the	  most	  real-­‐world	  political	  misinformation	  is	  negative	  rather	  than	  positive,	  the	  experimental	  manipulations	  in	  this	  dissertation	  employ	  only	  negative	  misinformation.	  Although	  the	  underlying	  mechanism	  should	  be	  similar	  for	  both	  types	  positive	  and	  negative	  information,	  I	  would	  expect	  that	  negative	  information	  would	  create	  a	  stronger	  belief	  echo	  given	  the	  asymmetric	  impact	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  information	  on	  evaluations	  (Fiske	  1980).6	  Chapter	  7	  discusses	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  potential	  for	  belief	  echoes	  to	  be	  generated	  by	  positive	  misinformation.	  	  	  








experimental	  results.	  The	  Mechanical	  Turk	  sample	  tends	  to	  be	  slightly	  younger	  and	  more	  liberal	  than	  the	  general	  population.	  Neither	  of	  these	  characteristics	  should	  affect	  the	  magnitude	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  Although	  partisanship	  does	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  belief	  echoes,	  the	  experiments	  in	  this	  dissertation	  manipulate	  partisanship	  such	  that	  subjects	  are	  presented	  with	  misinformation	  that	  either	  reinforces	  or	  contradicts	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  partisan	  preferences.	  	  	  
Experiment	  1:	  The	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  Experiment	  1	  examines	  whether	  exposure	  to	  corrected	  misinformation	  creates	  belief	  echoes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  delayed	  correction	  .	  I	  predict	  that	  exposure	  to	  the	  misinformation	  will	  continue	  to	  negatively	  affect	  attitudes	  and	  perceptions	  of	  electability	  even	  when	  it	  is	  effectively	  corrected.	  
	  
H1.	  Belief	  echoes	  affect	  evaluations:	  exposure	  to	  negative	  information	  will	  affect	  evaluations	  even	  after	  it	  is	  corrected.	  	  	  








reading	  the	  correction	  leaves	  people	  with	  the	  same	  level	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  negative	  information	  as	  those	  who	  never	  read	  it	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  both	  of	  these	  groups	  are	  more	  skeptical	  of	  the	  negative	  information	  than	  those	  who	  did	  not	  read	  a	  correction.	  	  	  




Next,	  participants	  read	  an	  article	  that	  included	  information	  about	  the	  race	  and	  brief	  biographical	  details	  about	  the	  candidates.	  The	  article	  read	  by	  the	  Corrected	  Misinformation	  and	  Uncorrected	  Misinformation	  	  groups	  also	  included	  a	  statement	  saying	  that	  one	  of	  the	  candidates	  had	  accepted	  donations	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon.	  For	  all	  participants,	  the	  partisanship	  of	  the	  candidate	  featured	  in	  the	  article	  varied	  depending	  on	  their	  own	  partisanship:	  the	  version	  given	  to	  Republicans	  described	  a	  Democratic	  candidate	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  candidate’s	  party	  was	  not	  an	  experimental	  manipulation:	  all	  participants	  read	  an	  article	  featuring	  a	  candidate	  of	  the	  opposing	  party.	  	  After	  completing	  a	  short	  distractor	  task,	  participants	  read	  a	  second	  article	  about	  the	  race.	  For	  those	  in	  the	  Corrected	  Misinformation	  condition,	  the	  following	  correction	  was	  appended	  to	  the	  article:	  	  
Correction:	  Regarding	  the	  candidates’	  biographies,	  an	  article	  published	  in	  the	  




claim	  that	  the	  candidate	  accepted	  donations	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon,	  fell	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  “definitely	  false”	  to	  “definitely	  true.”	  	  	  
Experiment	  1	  Results	  The	  first	  manipulation	  check	  ensures	  that	  exposure	  to	  the	  information	  that	  a	  candidate	  accepted	  donations	  from	  a	  felon	  negatively	  affects	  subjects’	  evaluations.	  An	  analysis	  of	  variance	  demonstrated	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  exposure	  to	  negative	  information	  on	  evaluations	  (F=13.8,	  p	  <	  .001)10.	  The	  second	  manipulation	  check	  makes	  certain	  that	  participants	  found	  the	  correction	  convincing.	  Figure	  3.1	  shows	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  participants	  in	  each	  condition	  believed	  both	  the	  factual	  information	  and	  the	  misinformation	  presented	  in	  the	  article.	  Answers	  of	  “definitely	  false”	  were	  coded	  as	  0	  and	  “definitely	  true”	  as	  5.	  	  	   	  





Figure	  3.1.	  Experiment	  1:	  Effectiveness	  of	  the	  correction	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corrected,	  the	  candidate	  evaluations	  of	  the	  Corrected	  Misinformation	  condition	  should	  be	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  
Figure	  3.2	  displays	  the	  mean	  evaluation	  of	  the	  candidate	  by	  condition.11	  
Figure	  3.2.	  Experiment	  1:	  Effect	  of	  misinformation	  on	  attitudes	  	  
	  	  
















correction	  found	  it	  convincing.	  In	  terms	  of	  effect	  size,	  the	  correction	  is	  successful	  at	  muting	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  attitudinal	  effects	  of	  exposure	  to	  misinformation.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  experiment	  show	  that	  belief	  echoes	  exist:	  even	  when	  a	  false	  claim	  is	  successfully	  discredited,	  it	  continues	  to	  affect	  attitudes.	  	   Figure	  3.3.	  Experiment	  1:	  Effect	  of	  misinformation	  on	  electability	  perceptions	  shows	  mean	  perceptions	  of	  electability	  for	  each	  condition.12	  	  These	  results	  are	  testing	  H2,	  which	  proposes	  that	  exposure	  to	  misinformation	  affects	  perceptions	  of	  a	  candidate’s	  electability,	  even	  when	  the	  misinformation	  is	  successfully	  corrected.	  	  
Figure	  3.3.	  Experiment	  1:	  Effect	  of	  misinformation	  on	  electability	  perceptions	  	  
	  	   An	  analysis	  of	  variance	  shows	  that	  perceptions	  of	  McKenna’s	  electability	  in	  the	  uncorrected	  and	  correction	  misinformation	  conditions	  do	  not	  differ	  significantly	  















from	  each	  other.	  However,	  perceptions	  in	  both	  conditions	  are	  significantly	  lower	  than	  perceptions	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  (F	  =	  5.05,	  p	  <	  .05).	  Even	  though	  subjects	  in	  the	  corrected	  misinformation	  condition	  fully	  accepted	  the	  correction,	  they	  still	  perceived	  the	  candidate	  as	  less	  electable	  than	  subjects	  in	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  	  








Republican	  reading	  the	  same	  information	  will	  likely	  experience	  a	  weaker	  initial	  reaction	  and	  thus	  a	  smaller	  change	  in	  evaluation	  (Goren	  2002).	  Because	  the	  size	  of	  their	  initial	  responses	  varies,	  so	  might	  also	  the	  belief	  echo	  that	  this	  response	  creates.	  	  While	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  Experiment	  2	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Experiment	  1,	  the	  format	  of	  the	  misinformation	  and	  correction	  is	  altered.	  Experiment	  1	  followed	  a	  structure	  similar	  to	  tests	  of	  belief	  perseverance	  in	  psychology	  experiments,	  in	  which	  individuals	  believe	  the	  misinformation	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  before	  it	  was	  corrected.	  Experiment	  2	  eliminates	  the	  two-­‐article	  format	  and	  presents	  the	  correction	  immediately	  after	  the	  misinformation.	  This	  “immediate	  correction”	  format	  more	  closely	  parallels	  how	  corrections	  are	  increasingly	  presented	  in	  the	  media.	  	  Hypotheses	  3	  and	  4	  predicts	  that	  belief	  echoes	  will	  be	  created	  even	  when	  misinformation	  is	  corrected	  instantly.	  	  




A	  person’s	  party	  identification	  may	  play	  a	  conscious	  or	  unconscious	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  In	  Experiment	  1,	  participants	  who	  read	  the	  correction	  claimed	  not	  to	  believe	  the	  discredited	  information.	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  that	  this	  response	  was	  attributable	  to	  an	  experimenter	  demand	  effect,	  and	  their	  “genuine”	  belief	  was	  that	  the	  misinformation	  was	  true.	  Motivated	  reasoning	  may	  also	  be	  a	  factor	  at	  an	  unconscious	  level.	  A	  piece	  of	  negative	  information	  that	  confirms	  pre-­‐existing	  beliefs	  may	  activate	  similar	  beliefs,	  and	  thus	  affect	  the	  candidate’s	  overall	  evaluation.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  Democrat	  learns	  that	  a	  Republican	  candidate	  accepted	  campaign	  donations	  from	  a	  felon,	  it	  may	  immediately	  bring	  to	  mind	  other	  examples	  of	  corrupt	  Republicans	  and	  negative	  thoughts	  about	  the	  Republican	  party	  more	  generally	  (Redlawsk	  2002).	  Even	  after	  the	  initial	  information	  is	  recognized	  as	  invalid,	  the	  other	  activated	  concepts	  may	  continue	  to	  exert	  an	  unconscious	  effect	  on	  her	  evaluation	  of	  the	  candidate.	  	  To	  test	  the	  effect	  of	  partisanship	  on	  belief	  echoes,	  Experiment	  2	  varies	  whether	  the	  misinformation	  confirms	  or	  counters	  the	  participant’s	  party	  identification.	  Hypothesis	  2	  predicts	  that	  belief	  echoes	  will	  be	  stronger	  when	  the	  misinformation	  reinforces	  pre-­‐existing	  partisan	  attitudes.	  	  	  




Experiment	  2	  Design	  A	  total	  of	  474	  people	  were	  recruited	  via	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  The	  demographics	  of	  the	  sample	  are	  available	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  The	  experiment	  was	  a	  3	  (misinformation	  format)	  x	  2	  (candidate	  party)	  Participants	  were	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  six	  conditions.	  The	  full	  design	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  3.4.	  Experiment	  2:	  Design	  	  
Figure	  3.4.	  Experiment	  2:	  Design	  	   MISINFORMATION	  FORMAT	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GetTheFacts.org]	  has	  shown	  no	  record	  of	  any	  donation	  from	  Elsio	  to	  McKenna’s	  campaign.	  Campaigns	  are	  required	  to	  disclose	  the	  names	  of	  all	  individuals	  who	  contribute	  $200	  or	  more	  in	  an	  election	  cycle,	  and	  [the	  
Ledger/GetTheFacts.org]	  did	  not	  find	  Elsio's	  name	  listed.	  	  A	  separate	  condition,	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  varied	  the	  source	  of	  the	  correction.	  Two	  different	  sources,	  The	  Iowa	  Ledger	  and	  GetTheFacts.org,	  were	  equally	  successful	  at	  correcting	  the	  misinformation	  and	  so	  were	  combined	  for	  the	  analyses	  presented	  here.	  	  	  




Figure	  3.5	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  this	  manipulation	  check,	  presenting	  the	  average	  belief	  in	  the	  correction	  for	  each	  group.13	  The	  middle	  column	  represents	  the	  combined	  opposing-­‐party	  and	  same-­‐party	  conditions.	  	  
	  	   	  




Figure	  3.5.	  Experiment	  2:	  Effectiveness	  of	  correction	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corrected.	  H3	  predicts	  that	  belief	  echoes	  will	  be	  created	  even	  when	  the	  misinformation	  is	  corrected	  immediately.	  Figure	  3.6	  presents	  the	  mean	  candidate	  evaluations	  for	  each	  group.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.6.	  Experiment	  2:	  Effect	  of	  misinformation	  on	  attitudes	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correction	  mutes	  slightly	  over	  half	  of	  the	  attitudinal	  effects	  of	  exposure	  to	  misinformation.14	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  and	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  candidate	  party	  (F=216.9,	  p	  <	  .001):	  in	  every	  condition.	  	  In	  each	  group,	  participants	  provided	  lower	  evaluations	  of	  the	  candidate	  when	  he	  was	  of	  the	  opposing	  party.	  However,	  an	  analysis	  of	  variance	  shows	  no	  significant	  interaction	  between	  candidate	  party	  and	  exposure	  to	  corrections.	  H4	  is	  not	  supported—belief	  echoes	  are	  not	  conditional	  on	  or	  significantly	  magnified	  by	  partisanship.	  This	  pattern	  suggests	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  cannot	  be	  explained	  solely	  as	  a	  process	  of	  motivated	  reasoning.	  	  	  
















Chapter	  4 -­‐	  Affective	  and	  cognitive	  processes	  of	  belief	  echo	  




is	  false,	  but	  reasons	  that	  its	  presence	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  other	  negative	  information	  being	  true.	  This	  chapter	  describes	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  processes	  that	  might	  drive	  the	  creation	  of	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes,	  and	  presents	  the	  results	  from	  experiments	  designed	  to	  isolate	  both	  processes.	  	  	  	  	  




for	  more	  than	  a	  few	  minutes.	  Subjects	  were	  shown	  photographs	  of	  two	  candidates	  and	  told	  each	  candidate’s	  issue	  positions.	  After	  twelve	  minutes,	  they	  were	  shown	  the	  photographs	  of	  the	  candidates	  again	  (without	  the	  associated	  issue	  positions)	  and	  asked	  to	  indicate	  which	  candidate	  they	  would	  vote	  for.	  Every	  participant	  expressed	  a	  preference	  for	  the	  candidate	  who	  was	  initially	  described	  as	  sharing	  their	  issue	  opinions.	  However,	  when	  immediately	  afterwards	  subjects	  were	  asked	  about	  candidates’	  issue	  positions,	  they	  had	  no	  memory	  of	  their	  stances.	  Instead,	  they	  justified	  their	  choice	  with	  reasons	  like	  “he	  just	  seems	  more	  likeable”	  and	  “he	  looks	  more	  trustworthy.”	  (Coronel	  et	  al,	  p.	  9)	  	  This	  lingering	  effect	  on	  evaluations	  occurs	  because	  the	  affective	  response	  generated	  by	  the	  initial	  information	  continues	  to	  exert	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  subjects’	  summary	  evaluation	  of	  the	  candidates	  even	  though	  the	  information	  itself	  has	  disappeared	  from	  memory.	  This	  study	  sheds	  light	  on	  how	  to	  understanding	  how	  belief	  echoes	  can	  be	  created	  through	  an	  affective	  process.	  Reading	  the	  initial	  misinformation	  (for	  example,	  that	  a	  candidate	  accepted	  donations	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon)	  generates	  a	  strong	  affective	  response.	  	  The	  correction,	  however,	  does	  not	  generate	  an	  affective	  response	  of	  an	  equal	  and	  opposite	  magnitude.	  A	  person’s	  summary	  evaluation	  thus	  remains	  affected	  by	  the	  initial	  affective	  response	  generated	  by	  the	  misinformation—even	  though	  when	  asked,	  she	  is	  still	  quite	  capable	  of	  recalling	  the	  correction.15	  However,	  this	  description	  of	  online	  processing	  




as	  it	  relates	  to	  affective	  belief	  echoes	  leaves	  a	  central	  question	  unanswered:	  when	  misinformation	  is	  corrected,	  why	  is	  it	  that	  the	  misinformation	  exerts	  a	  lasting	  effect	  on	  evaluations,	  but	  the	  correction	  does	  not?	  	  
	  








“correction”	  is	  valenced	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  as	  the	  misinformation.	  In	  both	  studies,	  the	  affective	  charge	  of	  the	  false	  information	  was	  only	  eliminated	  when	  the	  correction	  carried	  an	  equal	  and	  opposite	  affective	  charge.	  	  Correcting	  a	  piece	  of	  false	  information	  by	  negating	  may	  not	  only	  be	  insufficient	  to	  compensate	  for	  its	  affective	  impact,	  but	  may	  in	  some	  circumstances	  negations	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  initial	  misinformation	  (Hasson	  &	  Glucksberg	  2005).	  Because	  of	  how	  negations	  are	  mentally	  encoded,	  the	  affective	  response	  produced	  by	  a	  negation	  can	  be	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  is	  intended.	  To	  use	  a	  canonical	  example,	  processing	  the	  statement	  “Richard	  is	  not	  a	  crook”	  may	  produce	  an	  affective	  response	  anchored	  to	  criminality	  rather	  than	  to	  honesty	  (Mayo	  et	  al	  2003).	  	  The	  implication	  of	  these	  findings	  for	  belief	  echoes	  is	  that	  framing	  a	  correction	  as	  an	  affirmation	  (for	  example,	  “McKenna’s	  campaign	  donors	  are	  all	  citizens	  of	  good	  standing”)	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  negation	  (“McKenna	  did	  not	  accept	  donations	  from	  a	  felon”)	  may	  be	  more	  effective	  at	  reducing	  belief	  echoes,	  because	  the	  affirmation	  carries	  a	  positive	  affective	  charge	  that	  can	  counterbalance	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  misinformation.	  	  	  




what	  Gilbert	  (1989)	  calls	  “cognitively	  busy,”	  their	  reactions	  and	  attitudes	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  such	  automatic	  processes.	  As,	  such	  affective	  belief	  echoes	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  under	  these	  conditions.	  	  A	  study	  by	  Gilbert	  and	  his	  colleagues	  (1993)	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  impact	  of	  information	  known	  to	  be	  false	  is	  magnified	  under	  conditions	  of	  cognitive	  load.	  	  In	  the	  experiment,	  subjects	  were	  told	  that	  to	  play	  the	  part	  of	  a	  trial	  court	  judge	  and	  exposed	  to	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  about	  a	  criminal	  incident.	  They	  were	  informed	  that	  statements	  printed	  in	  black	  were	  true	  and	  those	  printed	  in	  red	  were	  false.	  Several	  of	  the	  false	  statements	  exacerbated	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  crime.	  Half	  of	  the	  subjects	  were	  exposed	  to	  the	  statements	  while	  simultaneously	  completing	  a	  number	  memorization	  task.	  Finally,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  consider	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  crime	  and	  recommend	  a	  prison	  term	  length	  for	  the	  accused.	  The	  subjects	  who	  were	  under	  cognitive	  load	  when	  reading	  the	  information	  recommended	  longer	  sentences	  for	  the	  accused:	  they	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  false	  exacerbating	  statements	  printed	  in	  red.	  However,	  questioning	  the	  subjects	  showed	  that	  they	  were	  fully	  aware	  that	  the	  statements	  were	  false	  and	  unaware	  that	  they	  were	  affecting	  their	  decision.	  	  In	  real-­‐world	  settings,	  then,	  affective	  belief	  echoes	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  when	  readers’	  attention	  is	  elsewhere.	  For	  example,	  a	  Pew	  study	  conducted	  after	  the	  2012	  Presidential	  election	  showed	  that	  of	  Americans	  who	  watched	  the	  news	  on	  election	  night,	  27%	  were	  “dual	  screeners,”	  using	  both	  the	  television	  and	  the	  internet	  to	  follow	  the	  returns	  (Pew	  2012c).	  	  	  




	  “Where	  there’s	  smoke,	  there’s	  fire”	  is	  a	  useful	  metaphor	  for	  understanding	  the	  cognitive	  mechanism	  of	  belief	  echo	  creation.	  Cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  are	  created	  through	  a	  conscious	  process	  in	  which	  a	  person	  accepts	  a	  correction,	  but	  also	  infers	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  false	  claim	  suggests	  that	  other	  negative	  information	  about	  the	  candidate	  or	  policy	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  him	  to	  evaluate	  the	  candidate	  more	  negatively.	  	  	  




physiological	  reactions	  to	  different	  types	  of	  feedback.	  Despite	  this	  debriefing,	  when	  subjects	  are	  asked	  to	  predict	  their	  actual	  performance	  on	  the	  task,	  those	  who	  were	  originally	  given	  positive	  feedback	  tend	  to	  think	  they	  did	  better	  than	  average,	  and	  those	  who	  were	  given	  negative	  feedback	  think	  they	  did	  worse	  (Ross,	  Lepper,	  &	  Hubbard	  1975).	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  effect	  is	  that	  exposure	  to	  the	  initial	  results	  caused	  subjects	  to	  think	  about	  the	  possible	  reasons	  for	  the	  negative	  or	  positive	  scores	  (Anderson,	  New,	  &	  Speer	  1985).	  When	  the	  scores	  were	  discredited,	  the	  reasons	  remained.	  This	  explanation	  for	  belief	  perseverance	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “mental	  model”	  explanation.	  The	  misinformation	  induces	  people	  to	  build	  so-­‐called	  “mental	  models”	  that	  persist	  even	  after	  the	  misinformation	  is	  discredited.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  misinformation	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  hearing	  that	  a	  candidate	  accepted	  a	  donation	  from	  a	  felon	  might	  cause	  someone	  to	  think	  about	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  candidate	  might	  be	  the	  type	  of	  person	  who	  accepts	  money	  from	  a	  felon:	  he	  is	  untrustworthy,	  he	  is	  corrupt.	  These	  reasons	  not	  only	  continue	  to	  affect	  evaluations	  even	  after	  the	  claim	  is	  discredited,	  but	  may	  even	  become	  a	  justification	  for	  why	  the	  candidate	  was	  falsely	  accused	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  




unique	  disposition	  from	  behaviors	  that	  can	  be	  entirely	  explained	  by	  the	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  occur"	  (Gilbert	  1995).	  In	  the	  experiments	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  situation	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors—faulty	  opposition	  research,	  the	  desire	  of	  a	  candidate	  to	  smear	  his	  opponent,	  or	  bad	  record-­‐keeping.	  Cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  are	  created	  when	  a	  person	  ignores	  these	  situational	  factors	  and	  instead	  attributes	  the	  accusation	  to	  a	  fault	  in	  the	  accused	  candidate’s	  character.	  	  Research	  suggests	  that	  correspondence	  bias	  is	  lessened	  when	  people	  process	  misinformation	  under	  conditions	  of	  suspicion,	  defined	  as	  a	  state	  in	  which	  "the	  individual	  actively	  entertains	  multiple,	  plausibly	  rival	  hypotheses	  about	  the	  motives	  or	  genuineness	  of	  a	  person's	  behavior"	  (Fein	  et	  al	  1997).	  Suspicion	  lessens	  the	  likelihood	  that	  perceivers	  will	  make	  dispositional	  inferences	  from	  behavior	  (i.e.	  engage	  in	  correspondence	  bias),	  and	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  will	  attribute	  a	  given	  behavior	  or	  incident	  to	  situational	  factors	  (for	  instance,	  poor	  reporting	  or	  a	  deliberate	  smear	  campaign).	  As	  such,	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  when	  subjects	  are	  suspicious	  of	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  false	  claim.	  In	  contrast,	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  when	  subjects	  either	  have	  pre-­‐existing	  reasons	  to	  distrust	  the	  accused	  candidate,	  or	  pre-­‐existing	  reasons	  to	  trust	  the	  accuser.	  Partisanship	  may	  provide	  exactly	  these	  reasons.	  	  	  
Using	  partisanship	  to	  distinguish	  between	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  




the	  information	  is	  processed,	  which	  itself	  is	  a	  function	  of	  both	  the	  information	  environment	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  individual.	  The	  experiments	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  designed	  to	  distinguish	  between	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  To	  do	  so,	  they	  take	  advantage	  of	  a	  unique	  aspect	  of	  the	  political	  world:	  the	  fact	  that	  partisans	  tend	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  opposing	  party	  and	  trusting	  of	  claims	  made	  by	  their	  own	  party	  (Hetherington	  2001).	  This	  predisposition	  can	  help	  to	  distinguish	  between	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  Partisanship	  should	  be	  aa	  stronger	  predictor	  of	  belief	  echoes	  in	  situations	  likely	  to	  produce	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  (usually	  those	  that	  invoke	  more	  cognitive	  processing),	  and	  a	  weaker	  predictor	  of	  belief	  echoes	  in	  situations	  likely	  to	  produce	  affective	  belief	  echoes	  (those	  that	  invoke	  less	  cognitive	  processing).	  	  Cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  are	  generated	  through	  a	  conscious	  process	  in	  which	  a	  person	  infers	  that	  an	  accusation	  against	  a	  candidate—even	  if	  false—increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  candidate	  is	  untrustworthy.	  Partisanship	  should	  heighten	  this	  effect	  since	  the	  candidate	  will	  already	  perceived	  as	  less	  trustworthy	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  opposing	  party.	  When	  the	  misinformation	  concerns	  a	  candidate	  or	  policy	  of	  a	  person’s	  own	  party,	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  should	  be	  minimized	  because	  her	  basic	  orientation	  towards	  the	  political	  object	  is	  positive	  rather	  than	  negative.17	  These	  chains	  of	  reasoning—which	  are	  heightened	  by	  












Experiment	  3:	  Creating	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes	  through	  elaboration	  In	  Experiment	  3,	  I	  expose	  subjects	  to	  misinformation	  and	  corrections	  in	  a	  format	  designed	  to	  heighten	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  This	  experiment	  is	  substantially	  different	  from	  the	  format	  of	  the	  experiments	  in	  Chapter	  3	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  In	  those	  studies,	  both	  the	  misinformation	  and	  correction	  was	  embedded	  within	  the	  text	  of	  a	  newspaper	  article.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Experiment	  3,	  the	  misinformation	  and	  correction	  are	  in	  newspaper	  headlines.	  Subjects	  are	  encouraged	  to	  read	  each	  headline	  carefully	  and	  study	  the	  images.	  The	  design	  is	  meant	  to	  encourage	  cognitive	  processing	  of	  the	  misinformation	  and	  correction.	  	  	   Experiment	  3	  is	  designed	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  belief	  echoes	  will	  only	  be	  created	  among	  those	  most	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  reasoning	  process	  that	  drives	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  	  
H5:	  Belief	  echoes	  will	  only	  be	  created	  among	  those	  predisposed	  to	  dislike	  the	  candidate.	  	  




Figure	  4.1.	  Experiment	  3:	  Design	  	   MISINFORMATION	  FORMAT	   	  





as	  subject	   N=29	   N=26	   N=20	   N=22	  
Candidate	  is	  
same	  party	  as	  
subject	   N=14	   N=25	   N=23	   N=19	  	  While	  the	  experiments	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  looked	  only	  at	  one	  type	  of	  misinformation	  (accepting	  donations	  from	  a	  felon),	  Experiment	  3	  employs	  three	  different	  types	  of	  misinformation.	  
• Candidate	  accepted	  donations	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon.	  
• Candidate’s	  health	  care	  policies	  doubled	  infant	  mortality.	  




proceeding	  to	  the	  headlines,	  they	  read	  brief	  biographical	  descriptions	  of	  each	  of	  the	  candidates.	  The	  party	  of	  each	  of	  the	  candidates	  was	  emphasized	  in	  the	  descriptions	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  for	  text	  of	  the	  candidate	  descriptions).	  	  	   Each	  headline	  was	  presented	  on	  a	  separate	  page.	  Subjects	  in	  the	  corrected	  misinformation	  conditions	  read	  a	  total	  of	  six	  different	  headlines.	  Subjects	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  read	  four	  headlines.	  Each	  headline	  followed	  a	  similar	  visual	  format	  to	  the	  example	  shown	  below	  in	  Figure	  4.2.	  Experiment	  3:	  Example	  Article	  Format	  	  
Figure	  4.2.	  Experiment	  3:	  Example	  Article	  Format	  	  












Table	  4.1.	  Experiment	  3:	  Misinformation	  condition	  headlines	  	  
	  
Condition	   Misinformation	  Headline	   Correction	  Headline	  
Corrected	  
Misinformation	  1	  
Felon	  Donation	  Scandal	  Hits	  
Mitchell	  Campaign	  
Ross	  accuses	  Mitchell	  of	  accepting	  
campaign	  donations	  from	  convicted	  
felon	  Joe	  Fenz	  
Mitchell’s	  Donation	  Records	  
Show	  No	  Felon	  Donations	  
A	  Nevada	  Tribune	  investigation	  of	  
Mitchell’s	  finances	  found	  no	  
record	  of	  donations	  from	  
convicted	  felon	  Joe	  Fenz	  
Corrected	  
Misinformation	  2	  
Past	  Policies	  Return	  to	  Haunt	  
Mitchell	  Campaign	  
Ross	  says	  Mitchell’s	  health	  care	  
reforms	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  
newborn	  deaths	  in	  Nevada	  	  
Newborn	  Deaths	  in	  Nevada	  Did	  
Not	  Increase	  Under	  Mitchell’s	  
Hospital	  Reforms	  
A	  Nevada	  Tribune	  investigation	  of	  
hospital	  records	  shows	  no	  rise	  in	  
infant	  mortality	  in	  Nevada	  




Corruption	  Scandal	  Hits	  	  
Mitchell	  Campaign	  
Ross	  accuses	  Mitchell	  of	  spending	  
$294,000	  of	  taxpayer	  money	  to	  
finance	  three	  family	  vacations	  to	  
the	  Florida	  coast	  
Mitchell’s	  Vacation	  not	  Paid	  	  
for	  with	  Taxpayer	  Money	  
A	  Nevada	  Tribune	  investigation	  of	  
Mitchell’s	  finance	  reports	  shows	  
he	  did	  not	  use	  public	  funds	  to	  pay	  
for	  his	  vacations	  	  	   After	  reading	  the	  articles,	  all	  subjects	  completed	  a	  two-­‐minute	  distractor	  task	  (see	  Appendix	  C).	  Then,	  they	  answered	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  assessing	  their	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  candidates	  (see	  Appendix	  B).	  	  Finally,	  a	  manipulation	  check	  ensured	  that	  the	  correction	  was	  fully	  accepted.	  	  	  	  




more	  likely	  to	  believe	  the	  misinformation	  if	  it	  was	  about	  a	  candidate	  from	  their	  own	  party:	  there	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  candidate	  party	  and	  corrected	  misinformation	  for	  any	  of	  the	  three	  conditions.	  	  	   Figure	  4.3.	  Experiment	  3:	  Evaluations	  of	  candidate	  by	  same-­‐party	  shows	  evaluations	  of	  the	  candidate	  among	  those	  in	  the	  same	  party	  condition.	  H5	  suggests	  that	  belief	  echoes	  should	  not	  be	  created	  among	  these	  subjects.	  The	  Figure	  4.3	  shows	  that	  evaluations	  of	  the	  candidate	  are	  actually	  higher	  for	  those	  who	  read	  the	  corrected	  misinformation	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  control	  group.	  	  	  
Figure	  4.3.	  Experiment	  3:	  Evaluations	  of	  candidate	  by	  same-­‐party	  condition	  	  

























concerned	  a	  candidate	  from	  the	  opposing	  party	  and	  the	  accusation	  came	  from	  a	  candidate	  of	  their	  own	  party.	  In	  each	  condition,	  evaluations	  were	  lower	  in	  the	  “corrected	  misinformation”	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  control	  condition.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.4.	  Experiment	  3:	  Evaluations	  of	  candidate	  opposing-­‐party	  condition	  	  
























Misinformation	  3	  condition	  (F=3.90,	  p	  <	  .05).	  In	  the	  Misinformation	  2	  condition,	  the	  interaction	  is	  not	  quite	  significant	  (F=2.90,	  p	  =	  .093).	  	  	  
Experiment	  4:	  Distinguishing	  between	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  belief	  




condition	  should	  exhibit	  evidence	  of	  belief	  echoes,	  regardless	  of	  party.	  As	  in	  Experiment	  2,	  exposure	  to	  the	  misinformation	  and	  correction	  embedded	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  story	  should	  create	  affective	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  
H6.	  In	  the	  post-­‐attitude	  recall	  task	  condition,	  subjects	  in	  the	  same-­‐party	  and	  opposing-­‐party	  conditions	  should	  both	  exhibit	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  predicts	  that	  among	  the	  subjects	  who	  completed	  the	  recall	  task	  before	  evaluating	  the	  candidate,	  only	  those	  predisposed	  to	  dislike	  the	  candidate	  should	  exhibit	  evidence	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  
H7.	  In	  the	  pre-­‐attitude	  recall	  task	  condition,	  partisanship	  should	  predict	  the	  creation	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  Finally,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  survey,	  all	  subjects	  in	  the	  corrected	  misinformation	  condition	  were	  asked	  whether	  reading	  the	  corrected	  misinformation	  affected	  their	  opinion	  of	  John	  McKenna.	  While	  their	  answers	  cannot	  provide	  any	  causal	  leverage,	  a	  research	  question	  asks	  whether	  the	  open-­‐ended	  answers	  exhibit	  evidence	  for	  the	  chain	  of	  reasoning	  that	  underlies	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  








which	  readers	  recognize	  the	  misinformation	  is	  false	  yet	  also	  use	  it	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  changing	  their	  evaluations,	  then	  this	  logic	  should	  appear	  in	  their	  responses.	  	  	   	  	  




Figure	  4.5.	  Experiment	  4:	  Belief	  echoes	  in	  post-­‐attitude	  recall	  task	  group	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Figure	  4.6.	  Experiment	  4:	  Belief	  echoes	  in	  pre-­‐attitude	  recall	  task	  group	  	  
	  	   Subjects’	  answers	  to	  the	  open-­‐ended	  questions,	  while	  not	  a	  formal	  test	  of	  the	  hypothesis,	  can	  lend	  some	  insight	  into	  whether	  people	  engage	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  reasoning	  that	  drives	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  Respondents	  were	  asked	  if	  reading	  about	  the	  accusation	  and	  the	  Iowa	  Ledger	  investigation	  changed	  their	  opinion	  of	  John	  McKenna.	  In	  the	  “same	  party”	  condition,	  59	  out	  of	  80	  respondents	  answered	  the	  question.	  In	  the	  “opposing	  party”	  condition,	  60	  out	  of	  74	  respondents	  offered	  an	  answer.	  I	  coded	  the	  answers	  for	  the	  five	  different	  binary	  categories	  described	  below:	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• No	  change	  in	  opinion	  about	  McKenna:	  response	  mentioned	  that	  their	  opinion	  of	  him	  did	  not	  change	  
• Raised	  opinion	  of	  McKenna:	  response	  mentioned	  that	  the	  accusation	  made	  them	  more	  positive	  towards	  McKenna	  
• Lowered	  opinion	  of	  the	  accuser,	  Hall:	  response	  mentioned	  it	  made	  them	  think	  more	  negatively	  of	  Hall	  
• Believed	  that	  the	  misinformation	  might	  still	  be	  true:	  response	  mentioned	  being	  suspicious	  that	  the	  misinformation	  was	  actually	  true	  	  Answers	  could	  fall	  into	  multiple	  categories.	  For	  instance,	  one	  subject	  wrote	  “It	  did	  not	  change	  my	  opinion	  of	  McKenna,	  which	  was	  lukewarm,	  but	  it	  made	  me	  think	  very	  poorly	  of	  Hall.	  	  It	  made	  me	  associate	  all	  of	  the	  slimy	  conniving	  political	  rhetoric	  with	  his	  character	  attack.”	  This	  respondent	  was	  coded	  as	  “no	  change	  in	  opinion	  about	  McKenna”	  as	  well	  as	  “lowered	  opinion	  of	  Hall.”	  Table	  4.2	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  responses	  for	  the	  same	  party	  condition	  and	  opposing	  party	  condition.22	  	   	  	  
Table	  4.2.	  Experiment	  4:	  Open-­‐ended	  response	  distribution	  	  
Category	   Same	  party	  condition	  
Opposing	  party	  
















Chapter	  5 –	  Changing	  incentives	  for	  politicians	  and	  




correctly	  discerning	  that	  it	  was	  worth	  getting	  a	  scolding	  from	  the	  journalistic	  church	  ladies	  if	  a	  stretch	  or	  an	  elide	  or	  an	  outright	  prevarication	  did	  damage	  to	  the	  opposition”	  (Carr	  2012).	  This	  chapter	  tests	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Carr’s	  intuition	  is	  true,	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  politicians	  are	  punished	  for	  making	  false	  claims	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  this	  effect	  varies	  by	  party.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  may	  also	  pose	  a	  disincentive	  for	  journalists	  to	  engage	  in	  active	  fact-­‐checking.	  Already,	  many	  media	  outlets	  are	  wary	  of	  actively	  adjudicating	  between	  factual	  claims,	  driven	  by	  a	  concern	  that	  doing	  so	  will	  cause	  them	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  biased	  (Graves	  2012a).	  The	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  suggests	  that	  even	  if	  journalists	  do	  engage	  in	  this	  potentially	  risky	  endeavor,	  misinformation’s	  effects	  cannot	  be	  entirely	  eliminated.	  However,	  belief	  persistence	  and	  belief	  echoes	  are	  not	  the	  only	  metric	  by	  which	  to	  measure	  the	  success	  of	  fact-­‐checking	  efforts.	  Fact-­‐checking	  may	  also	  serve	  a	  greater	  good	  by	  increasing	  trust	  in	  media	  more	  generally.	  If	  so,	  this	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  journalists	  to	  engage	  the	  often	  unrewarding	  task	  of	  fact-­‐checking,	  a	  task	  rendered	  even	  more	  Sisyphean	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  incentives	  facing	  journalists	  in	  regards	  to	  fact-­‐checking	  and	  introduces	  new	  factors	  into	  an	  already	  contested	  question	  complicated	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  




issue	  false	  claims,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  made	  by	  the	  media	  when	  deciding	  whether	  to	  correct	  those	  claims.	  As	  such,	  the	  experiments	  are	  designed	  to	  reflect	  the	  real-­‐world	  environment	  in	  which	  misinformation	  is	  corrected,	  including	  the	  choices	  facing	  media	  outlets	  about	  how	  to	  correct	  misinformation.	  	  As	  political	  campaigns	  have	  entered	  what	  some	  journalists	  have	  taken	  to	  calling	  a	  “post-­‐truth”	  age	  characterized	  by	  an	  indifference	  to	  factual	  accuracy	  (Fallows	  2012,	  Rainey	  2012),	  an	  active	  normative	  debate	  that	  has	  emerged	  among	  journalists	  over	  how	  factual	  disputes	  should	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  media	  (Sullivan	  2012;	  Greenhouse	  2012).	  Three	  competing	  perspectives	  have	  come	  to	  dominate	  this	  debate.	  The	  first	  approach	  views	  journalists	  as	  arbiters,	  holding	  that	  reporters	  themselves	  should	  adjudicate	  between	  factual	  claims,	  and	  carefully	  state	  (if	  possible	  within	  the	  article)	  when	  a	  claim	  is	  false.	  The	  second	  outsources	  this	  job	  to	  other	  institutions	  either	  within	  the	  media	  outlet	  (like	  the	  Washington	  Post’s	  “Fact	  Checker”	  column)	  or	  outside	  of	  it,	  like	  the	  independent	  FactCheck.org	  or	  Politifact.com.	  This	  is	  also	  often	  the	  de	  facto	  approach	  of	  television	  news,	  which	  frequently	  cites	  fact-­‐checking	  organizations	  when	  reporting	  claims.	  The	  third,	  colloquially	  known	  as	  the	  “he-­‐said,	  she-­‐said”	  approach,	  does	  not	  require	  that	  journalists	  adjudicate	  between	  facts.	  	  Instead,	  this	  approach	  holds	  that	  journalists	  should	  simply	  report	  on	  each	  side’s	  remarks	  and	  leave	  it	  to	  readers	  to	  determine	  which	  side	  is	  more	  convincing.23	  	  For	  example,	  on	  August	  29,	  2012,	  Paul	  Ryan	  spoke	  at	  the	  Republican	  National	  




Convention.	  His	  speech	  contained	  several	  statements	  that	  were	  misleading	  or,	  in	  several	  circumstances,	  factually	  inaccurate	  (Cooper	  2012).	  Most	  notably,	  Ryan	  claimed	  that	  a	  GM	  plant	  in	  his	  hometown	  of	  Janesville,	  Wisconsin,	  was	  closed	  under	  Obama’s	  administration.	  The	  plant	  actually	  closed	  while	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  in	  office.	  	  The	  media’s	  various	  responses	  to	  Ryan’s	  claims	  illustrate	  the	  three	  approaches	  outlined	  above	  and	  employed	  in	  this	  experiment:	  journalistic	  adjudication,	  outsourcing	  to	  fact-­‐checkers,	  and	  the	  “he-­‐said,	  she-­‐said”	  approach.	  Some	  media	  outlets,	  like	  the	  Associated	  Press’s	  article	  headlined	  “Ryan	  takes	  factual	  shortcuts	  in	  speech”	  corrected	  Ryan’s	  false	  claims	  outright	  (Woodward	  &	  Gillum	  2012).	  Others,	  like	  the	  USA	  Today,	  partnered	  with	  fact-­‐checking	  organizations	  like	  FactCheck.org	  to	  debunk	  Ryan’s	  statements	  (Farley	  et	  al	  2012).	  	  An	  article	  in	  the	  




Experiment	  5:	  Constraints	  on	  politicians	  and	  media	  	  




suggests	  that	  politicians	  are	  not	  always	  punished	  for	  unethical	  behavior.	  Whether	  a	  politician	  suffers	  electoral	  consequences	  for	  her	  malfeasance	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  partisanship:	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  affect	  evaluations	  less	  if	  the	  politician	  is	  of	  a	  person’s	  own	  party	  (Anderson	  &	  Tverdova	  2003).	  Time	  magazine’s	  Michael	  Scherer	  (2012)	  expresses	  a	  similar	  thought:	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  American	  voting	  public	  long	  ago	  demonstrated	  their	  willingness	  to	  simultaneously	  forgive	  fibs	  told	  by	  their	  own	  team	  and	  express	  umbrage	  at	  the	  deception	  offered	  by	  the	  other	  team.	  This	  experiment	  tests	  two	  hypotheses	  about	  how	  politicians	  are	  punished.	  The	  first	  seeks	  to	  confirm	  previous	  research	  showing	  that	  perceptions	  of	  integrity	  matter	  to	  overall	  evaluations,	  and	  predicts	  that	  politicians’	  evaluations	  will	  be	  lowered	  when	  their	  accusations	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  false.	  	  
H8:	  Politicians	  will	  be	  punished	  for	  making	  an	  accusation	  when	  the	  claim	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  false.	  	  The	  second	  predicts	  an	  interaction	  between	  evaluations	  of	  the	  accuser	  and	  the	  party	  of	  the	  subject.	  Specifically,	  it	  predicts	  an	  effect	  similar	  to	  that	  found	  in	  studies	  of	  corruption:	  that	  politicians	  will	  suffer	  more	  serious	  consequences	  for	  lying	  from	  non-­‐supporters	  than	  from	  supporters.	  	  




	   	  




credible	  than	  one	  that	  confirmed	  their	  beliefs.	  Gentzkow	  and	  Shapiro	  (2006)	  show	  that	  a	  similar	  pattern	  occurs	  when	  people	  evaluate	  media	  outlets:	  consumers	  perceive	  that	  a	  media	  source	  is	  of	  higher	  quality	  when	  it	  produces	  content	  that	  reinforces	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  beliefs.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  journalists’	  intuition	  that	  correcting	  misinformation	  may	  increase	  perceptions	  of	  bias	  among	  some	  of	  their	  readers	  may	  be	  well-­‐founded.	  	  




in	  January	  2012.	  Brisbane	  wrote	  that	  he	  was	  “looking	  for	  reader	  input	  on	  whether	  and	  when	  New	  York	  Times	  news	  reporters	  should	  challenge	  ‘facts’	  that	  are	  asserted	  by	  newsmakers	  they	  write	  about”	  (Brisbane	  2012).	  Public	  response,	  both	  on	  the	  




capable	  of	  adjudicating	  between	  competing	  factual	  claims.	  D’Angelo	  and	  Lombard	  (2008,	  page	  6)	  use	  the	  phrase	  “accountability	  frame”	  to	  describe	  news	  articles	  that	  “shift	  the	  emphasis	  of	  a	  news	  story	  away	  from	  news	  management	  and	  toward	  news	  norms.”	  In	  other	  words,	  accountability	  frames	  occur	  when	  media	  outlets	  are	  forthright	  about	  their	  efforts	  to	  discern	  the	  truth.	  In	  an	  experiment,	  accountability	  frames	  in	  news	  reporters	  lead	  readers	  to	  rate	  the	  press	  as	  having	  a	  higher	  news	  quality.	  If	  fact-­‐checking	  engenders	  a	  similar	  effect,	  this	  would	  provide	  a	  much-­‐needed	  incentive	  for	  journalists	  to	  continue	  to	  engage	  in	  fact-­‐checking	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes.	  	  	  	  
H11.	  When	  journalists	  actively	  arbitrate	  between	  factual	  claims,	  it	  will	  raise	  evaluations	  of	  media	  more	  generally	  	  
Experiment	  5	  Design	  A	  total	  of	  606	  people	  were	  recruited	  via	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk.	  The	  experiment	  was	  a	  5	  (misinformation	  format)	  x	  2	  (candidate	  party)	  between-­‐subjects	  design.	  Participants	  were	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  ten	  conditions.	  The	  full	  design	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  5.1.25	  	   	  





Figure	  5.1	  Experimental	  Design	  	  	   	  	  MISINFORMATION	  FORMAT	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Misinformation	  groups	  contained	  a	  paragraph	  describing	  an	  accusation	  made	  by	  Eric	  Hall,	  McKenna’s	  opponent:	  	   The	  campaign	  has	  heated	  up	  in	  recent	  weeks.	  On	  Sunday,	  Hall	  accused	  McKenna	  of	  accepting	  campaign	  donations	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon	  named	  Daniel	  Elsio.	  Elsio,	  who	  ran	  the	  largest	  drug	  ring	  in	  Iowa	  while	  McKenna	  was	  mayor,	  was	  convicted	  of	  first-­‐degree	  murder	  in	  2010.	  According	  to	  Hall,	  McKenna	  accepted	  over	  $10,000	  from	  Elsio.	  Hall	  commented	  that	  “McKenna’s	  corrupt	  behavior	  shows	  that	  he	  and	  other	  [Democrats/Republicans]	  can’t	  be	  trusted	  to	  do	  what's	  best	  for	  Iowa	  citizens.”	  	  In	  the	  correction	  conditions,	  this	  paragraph	  was	  followed	  immediately	  by	  a	  correction:	  	   However,	  further	  investigation	  of	  the	  campaign	  donation	  records	  by	  [journalists	  at	  the	  Iowa	  Ledger/the	  independent	  fact-­‐checking	  organization	  GetTheFacts.org]	  has	  shown	  no	  record	  of	  any	  donation	  from	  Elsio	  to	  McKenna’s	  campaign.	  Campaigns	  are	  required	  to	  disclose	  the	  names	  of	  all	  individuals	  who	  contribute	  $200	  or	  more	  in	  an	  election	  cycle,	  and	  [the	  








Finally,	  participants	  answered	  questions	  about	  four	  different	  news	  outlets:	  the	  USA	  Today,	  CNN,	  GetTheFacts.org,	  and	  the	  Iowa	  Ledger.	  For	  each	  outlet,	  they	  indicated	  their	  overall	  opinion	  about	  the	  outlet	  via	  a	  feeling	  thermometer;	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  thought	  the	  outlet	  could	  be	  trusted	  to	  get	  the	  facts	  right;	  and	  whether	  they	  believed	  it	  favors	  the	  Democrats	  or	  Republicans.	  For	  each	  outlet,	  the	  first	  two	  measures	  were	  significantly	  correlated	  (p	  <	  .001)	  and	  so	  were	  combined	  to	  form	  an	  overall	  evaluation	  measure.	  Question	  details	  are	  available	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  	   	  	  
Experiment	  5	  Results	  	  When	  are	  politicians	  punished?	  Figure	  5.2	  shows	  evaluations	  of	  Eric	  Hall,	  the	  candidate	  who	  accused	  John	  McKenna	  of	  accepting	  campaign	  contributions	  from	  a	  convicted	  felon.	  For	  this	  analysis,	  the	  “fact-­‐checking	  correction”	  and	  “newspaper	  correction”	  conditions	  were	  combined	  into	  a	  single	  “successful	  correction”	  condition,	  since	  a	  manipulation	  check	  showed	  that	  both	  were	  successful	  at	  correcting	  the	  misinformation.26	  The	  “unsuccessful	  correction”	  condition	  is	  the	  “he	  said,	  she	  said”	  format,	  which	  unlike	  fact-­‐checking	  and	  newspaper	  corrections	  did	  not	  eliminate	  belief	  persistence.	  	  
	  





Figure	  5.2	  Experiment	  5:	  Evaluations	  of	  accuser	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H9	  predicts	  that	  the	  “punishment”	  for	  lying	  will	  be	  more	  severe	  if	  the	  candidate	  is	  of	  the	  opposing	  party.	  This	  hypothesis,	  however,	  is	  not	  supported:	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  party	  and	  corrected	  misinformation.	  Politicians	  are	  punished	  equally	  for	  lying	  whether	  they	  are	  of	  a	  person’s	  own	  party	  or	  of	  the	  opposing	  party.	  	  	  	  
When	  are	  media	  rewarded?	  	   H10	  directly	  addresses	  journalists’	  concern	  that	  when	  they	  explicitly	  arbitrate	  between	  competing	  claims,	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  more	  biased	  than	  when	  they	  employ	  the	  “he-­‐said,	  she-­‐said”	  approach.	  Figure	  5.3	  shows	  the	  perceived	  bias	  of	  the	  




Figure	  5.3	  Experiment	  5:	  Perceived	  bias	  of	  Iowa	  Ledger	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they	  are	  familiar	  media	  outlets	  to	  most	  Americans.	  In	  addition,	  because	  neither	  is	  frequently	  cited	  as	  a	  partisan	  news	  outlet	  (in	  contrast	  to,	  for	  example,	  Fox	  News	  or	  
The	  New	  York	  Times),	  there	  is	  less	  potential	  for	  ceiling	  or	  floor	  effects	  to	  hide	  shifts	  in	  attitudes.	  The	  evaluation	  measure	  is	  comprised	  of	  feeling	  thermometers	  on	  CNN	  and	  the	  USA	  Today	  as	  well	  as	  questions	  asking	  whether	  each	  outlet	  could	  be	  trusted	  to	  “get	  the	  facts	  right.”	  The	  questions	  formed	  a	  highly	  reliable	  measure	  (α	  =	  .85).	  Question	  details	  are	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  	  	   Figure	  5.4	  shows	  media	  evaluation	  by	  condition.	  When	  no	  correction	  is	  issued,	  media	  is	  rated	  at	  6.14.	  When	  the	  correction	  is	  in	  the	  he-­‐said/she-­‐said	  format,	  it	  is	  6.04,	  not	  a	  significant	  difference.	  However,	  subjects	  who	  read	  a	  correction	  issued	  by	  the	  Iowa	  Ledger	  evaluated	  the	  mass	  media	  more	  positively,	  at	  6.49.27	  	  The	  difference	  is	  weakly	  significant	  	  (p	  <	  .1).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure	  5.4	  Experiment	  5:	  Media	  Evaluations	  	  
 	  	  Figure	  6	  show	  the	  same-­‐party	  and	  opposing-­‐party	  conditions	  combined.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  journalistic	  arbitration	  and	  party,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  mass	  media	  evaluations	  is	  not	  driven	  by	  partisans	  who	  read	  about	  their	  own	  candidate’s	  exoneration	  and	  as	  a	  result	  have	  more	  positive	  attitudes	  towards	  mass	  media.	  	  	  





























Chapter	  6 -­‐	  Conclusion	  Most	  existing	  research	  on	  misinformation	  focuses	  on	  examining	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  citizens	  hold	  misperceptions	  about	  the	  political	  world.	  While	  this	  line	  of	  research	  is	  important,	  I	  argue	  that	  given	  the	  increasing	  ubiquity	  of	  corrections	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  fact-­‐checking,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  examine	  how	  exposure	  to	  misinformation	  affects	  attitudes	  not	  only	  when	  corrections	  fail,	  but	  also	  when	  corrections	  succeed.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments,	  I	  examine	  how	  exposure	  to	  




In	  this	  conclusion,	  I	  review	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  dissertation	  and	  then	  outline	  the	  major	  consequences	  of	  belief	  echoes,	  including	  their	  impact	  on	  vote	  choice	  and	  political	  participation.	  I	  also	  explore	  how	  belief	  echoes	  may	  be	  created	  in	  the	  context	  of	  policy	  misinformation	  and	  positive	  false	  claims.	  Finally,	  I	  offer	  a	  set	  of	  practical	  strategies	  for	  minimizing	  the	  effects	  of	  misinformation,	  drawing	  on	  the	  mechanisms	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  4	  as	  well	  as	  the	  real-­‐world	  constraints	  facing	  the	  media	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  The	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  underscores	  a	  point	  made	  in	  the	  introduction:	  that	  to	  effectively	  minimize	  the	  effects	  of	  misinformation,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  consider	  both	  the	  structural	  factors	  that	  shape	  the	  media’s	  approach	  to	  correcting	  false	  claims	  as	  well	  as	  the	  individual-­‐level	  factors	  that	  influence	  how	  citizens	  choose,	  consume,	  and	  process	  political	  information.	  	  	  












Policy	  misinformation	  section	  that	  follows,	  I	  discuss	  how	  belief	  echoes	  might	  be	  created	  by	  policy	  misinformation.	  	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  treatment	  is	  the	  correction.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  misinformation,	  the	  format	  of	  the	  correction	  varies	  a	  great	  deal	  across	  experiments.	  In	  Experiment	  1,	  it	  was	  appended	  to	  a	  second	  article.	  In	  Experiment	  2,	  it	  appeared	  within	  the	  same	  article	  as	  the	  misinformation.	  In	  Experiment	  5,	  the	  source	  of	  the	  correction	  was	  varied.	  Across	  this	  variety	  of	  correction	  format,	  I	  found	  evidence	  for	  belief	  echoes.	  In	  addition,	  in	  the	  real	  world	  corrections	  are	  often	  much	  less	  definitive.	  In	  these	  situations,	  (as,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  “campaign	  correction”	  condition	  of	  Experiment	  5),	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  larger	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  misinformation	  on	  attitudes	  comprised	  of	  both	  belief	  echoes	  and	  belief	  persistence.	  	  	  
	  




echoes,	  the	  integration	  of	  that	  misinformation	  into	  a	  larger	  narrative	  may	  considerably	  amplify	  its	  effect.	  	  	  








	   Aside	  from	  any	  impact	  on	  vote	  choice,	  belief	  echoes	  resulting	  from	  negative	  information29	  can	  decrease	  enthusiasm	  for	  a	  candidate	  among	  his	  own	  supporters,	  as	  well	  as	  increase	  negative	  affect	  towards	  him	  among	  the	  opposition.	  Enthusiasm	  is	  linked	  with	  several	  forms	  of	  political	  participation	  (Marcus	  1988),	  suggesting	  that	  negative	  belief	  echoes	  could	  impact	  a	  candidate’s	  ability	  to	  raise	  money	  and	  find	  volunteers.	  	  	  
Factors	  that	  might	  amplify	  or	  minimize	  the	  magnitude	  of	  belief	  echoes	  While	  several	  factors	  may	  affect	  the	  size	  of	  belief	  echoes,	  there	  are	  two	  in	  particular	  –	  policy	  and	  positive	  misinformation	  –	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  given	  the	  patterns	  of	  political	  misinformation	  in	  today’s	  media	  environment.	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  reiterate	  that	  the	  factors	  that	  affect	  belief	  echoes	  are	  different	  than	  those	  that	  might	  affect	  belief	  persistence.	  Belief	  persistence	  occurs	  when	  citizens	  continue	  to	  believe	  a	  false	  claim	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  credible	  corrections.	  The	  experiments	  in	  this	  dissertation	  are	  specifically	  designed	  to	  eliminate	  belief	  persistence.	  In	  the	  political	  world,	  misinformation	  is	  rarely	  corrected	  as	  successfully	  as	  it	  is	  in	  these	  experiments.	  As	  such,	  the	  results	  almost	  certainly	  underestimate	  the	  overall	  effects	  of	  misinformation	  on	  attitudes.	  In	  non-­‐experimental	  settings,	  people	  whose	  attitudes	  are	  affected	  by	  a	  given	  piece	  of	  misinformation	  include	  not	  only	  those	  who	  experience	  belief	  echoes,	  but	  also	  those	  who	  continue	  to	  believe	  the	  misinformation	  and	  those	  who	  never	  encountered	  the	  correction.	  	  




Although	  the	  experiments	  in	  this	  dissertation	  focus	  on	  candidate	  misinformation,	  policy	  misinformation	  can	  also	  create	  belief	  echoes.	  The	  example	  of	  so-­‐called	  “death	  panels”	  provides	  a	  useful	  illustration	  of	  how	  policy	  misinformation	  can	  emerge	  and	  spread.	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  would	  create	  death	  panels	  first	  emerged	  in	  a	  commentary	  on	  the	  Act	  by	  Betsey	  McCaughey,	  a	  fellow	  at	  the	  conservatively-­‐aligned	  Manhattan	  Institute.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  shocking	  things	  I	  found	  in	  this	  bill,	  and	  there	  were	  many,	  is	  on	  Page	  425,	  where	  the	  Congress	  would	  make	  it	  mandatory—absolutely	  require—that	  every	  five	  years,	  people	  in	  Medicare	  have	  a	  required	  counseling	  session	  that	  will	  tell	  them	  how	  to	  end	  their	  life	  sooner,	  how	  to	  decline	  nutrition,	  how	  to	  decline	  being	  hydrated,	  how	  to	  go	  in	  to	  hospice	  care	  (Lawrence	  &	  Schafer	  2012).	  	  Within	  just	  a	  few	  days,	  both	  Politifact	  and	  Factcheck	  had	  dismissed	  her	  statement	  as	  false.	  The	  sessions	  were	  entirely	  voluntary	  and	  no	  evidence	  existed	  which	  suggested	  that	  counselors	  would	  coerce	  patients	  into	  declining	  treatments.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  McCaughey	  statement,	  the	  New	  York	  Post	  and	  the	  Wall	  Street	  












committees,	  or	  SuperPACs,	  could	  change	  that	  dynamic.	  These	  SuperPACs	  spend	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  money	  on	  campaign	  advertising,.	  More	  importantly,	  they	  are	  not	  explicitly	  affiliated	  with	  a	  candidate,	  meaning	  that	  their	  advertisements	  can	  be	  framed	  as	  coming	  from	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  organization.	  Strategically,	  these	  organizations	  are	  ideally	  situated	  to	  spread	  misinformation	  that	  could	  create	  positive	  belief	  echoes	  without	  the	  backlash	  that	  accompanied	  the	  Ryan	  marathon	  claim.	  30	  	  
Practical	  lessons	  for	  the	  media	  	  	   For	  better	  or	  worse,	  most	  of	  Americans’	  exposure	  to	  both	  misinformation	  and	  correction	  occurs	  through	  mainstream	  media	  coverage	  of	  politics.	  While	  bloggers	  and	  social	  media	  are	  growing	  in	  importance,	  most	  Americans	  still	  receive	  their	  political	  news	  through	  major	  news	  sources,	  even	  if	  that	  media	  is	  read	  on	  a	  computer	  screen	  rather	  than	  on	  newsprint	  (Pew	  2012).	  I	  offer	  three	  clear	  lessons	  for	  journalists	  on	  how	  to	  minimize	  belief	  echoes.	  	  




actually	  reinforce	  the	  very	  concept	  that	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  negate.	  In	  contrast,	  corrective	  affirmations	  may	  be	  more	  successful	  at	  muting	  the	  attitudinal	  effects	  of	  the	  initial	  misinformation.	  For	  example,	  while	  a	  correction	  in	  a	  form	  of	  a	  negation	  might	  read	  “Nikki	  did	  not	  cheat	  on	  her	  taxes,”	  a	  corrective	  affirmation	  would	  read	  that	  “Nikki	  paid	  her	  taxes	  in	  full.”	  Taking	  the	  time	  to	  formulate	  corrective	  affirmations	  may	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  that	  corrections	  will	  leave	  behind	  lingering	  belief	  echoes.	  	  




On	  average,	  it	  attracts	  more	  click	  overs	  from	  social	  media.	  It,	  quite	  often,	  will	  go	  viral	  and	  pull	  in	  a	  slew	  of	  ‘direct	  traffic’	  as	  folks	  e-­‐mail	  and	  instant	  message	  it	  to	  each	  other.	  And,	  when	  featured	  on	  the	  homepage,	  the	  Fact	  Checker	  signature	  draws	  eyeballs,	  and,	  with	  them,	  clicks	  (Wemple	  2012)	  One	  strategy	  for	  addressing	  false	  claims	  without	  directly	  repeating	  them	  (and	  thus	  creating	  belief	  echoes)	  may	  be	  to	  build	  stories	  around	  the	  larger	  question	  driving	  the	  false	  claim	  rather	  around	  than	  the	  isolated	  piece	  of	  misinformation.	  For	  example,	  instead	  of	  “fact-­‐checking”	  Paul	  Ryan’s	  false	  statement	  that	  Obama	  was	  responsible	  for	  closing	  a	  plant	  in	  Janesville,	  coverage	  could	  address	  the	  larger	  issue	  of	  manufacturing	  growth.31	  	  The	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  also	  raises	  larger	  questions	  about	  the	  marketplace	  of	  ideas	  assumption	  that	  underlies	  the	  media’s	  approach	  to	  misinformation.	  Traditionally,	  news	  organizations	  have	  walked	  a	  careful	  line	  between	  striving	  for	  timeliness	  and	  accuracy.	  Being	  timely	  means	  potentially	  publishing	  dubious	  or	  unverified	  claims	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  getting	  information	  to	  the	  public	  quickly.	  Accuracy,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  may	  require	  careful	  pre-­‐publication	  fact-­‐checking,	  which	  can	  result	  in	  time	  delays	  that	  costs	  the	  media	  outlet	  both	  economically	  and	  reputationally.	  Often,	  media	  outlets’	  solution	  to	  this	  dilemma	  was	  simply	  to	  publish	  first	  and	  correct	  later	  (Graves	  2012).	  	  Weighing	  these	  trade-­‐offs	  becomes	  even	  more	  complicated	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  given	  news	  article	  is	  not	  asserting	  a	  fact,	  but	  simply	  relaying	  someone	  else’s	  factual	  




assertion.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  a	  newspaper	  report	  on	  a	  candidate’s	  stump	  speech	  that	  also	  repeats	  misleading	  claims	  made	  in	  that	  stump	  speech.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  discuss	  the	  recent	  push	  for	  reporters	  to	  correct	  such	  falsehoods,	  preferably	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  article	  itself.	  This	  push	  is	  an	  important	  step	  forward	  from	  the	  “he	  said,	  she	  said”	  interpretation	  of	  objectivity	  long	  espoused	  by	  many	  journalists	  (Bennett	  2012).	  	  	  However,	  the	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  mean	  that	  this	  step	  forward	  may	  not	  be	  enough.	  Currently,	  reporters	  who	  seek	  to	  prevent	  misinformation	  from	  affecting	  attitudes	  do	  so	  by	  actively	  correcting	  the	  misinformation,	  either	  in	  a	  sidebar	  or	  within	  the	  text	  of	  the	  article.	  Indeed,	  as	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  this	  is	  the	  “gold	  standard”	  of	  careful	  reporting	  and	  an	  approach	  specifically	  designed	  to	  prevent	  misinformation	  from	  affecting	  attitudes.	  But	  the	  existence	  of	  belief	  echoes	  means	  that	  news	  outlets’	  obligation	  may	  be	  not	  just	  to	  correct	  misinformation	  but	  to	  avoid	  spreading	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  If	  the	  marketplace	  of	  ideas	  worked	  as	  it	  should,	  this	  type	  of	  prior	  restraint	  would	  be	  unnecessary—it	  would	  not	  matter	  if	  a	  piece	  of	  misinformation	  entered	  the	  marketplace	  as	  long	  as	  it	  was	  corrected.	  But	  in	  a	  world	  of	  belief	  echoes,	  repeating	  false	  claims	  imposes	  serious	  costs,	  even	  if	  those	  claims	  are	  immediately	  corrected.	  	  	  
“Naming	  and	  shaming”	  	  




false	  claims,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  increasing	  the	  reputational	  cost	  of	  spreading	  misinformation	  (Nyhan	  2009).	  My	  research	  offers	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  this	  strategy	  may	  indeed	  be	  effective—perhaps	  not	  at	  convincing	  politicians	  to	  stop	  the	  practice	  altogether,	  but	  at	  least	  at	  ensuring	  that	  their	  actions	  have	  electoral	  consequences.	  	  Clarity	  about	  who	  is	  making	  false	  claims	  can	  also	  potentially	  reduce	  cognitive	  belief	  echoes.	  Including	  relevant	  information	  about	  an	  accuser’s	  motivation	  for	  spreading	  the	  false	  claim	  may	  encourage	  readers	  to	  construct	  an	  alternative	  chain	  of	  reasoning	  that	  blames	  the	  source	  of	  the	  misinformation	  (even	  if	  that	  source	  is	  simply	  a	  careless	  reporter)	  rather	  than	  its	  target.	  	  	  




falsify	  or	  due	  to	  partisan-­‐driven	  motivated	  reasoning	  (Nyhan	  &	  Reifler	  2010).	  And	  finally,	  this	  dissertation	  shows	  that	  even	  when	  citizens	  encounter,	  process,	  and	  accept	  the	  correction,	  they	  may	  not	  be	  immune	  to	  its	  attitudinal	  effects.	  	   Despite	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  belief	  echoes,	  there	  also	  exists	  cause	  for	  optimism.	  First,	  knowing	  how	  belief	  echoes	  are	  created	  also	  provides	  the	  tools	  necessary	  to	  minimize	  their	  effects.	  While	  no	  single	  solution	  exists,	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  drawing	  unnecessary	  attention	  to	  corrected	  misinformation;	  offering	  corrective	  affirmations	  rather	  than	  negations;	  and	  increasing	  clarity	  around	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  false	  claim	  may	  together	  succeed	  in	  greatly	  reducing	  the	  lingering	  effects	  of	  misinformation	  	  	   When	  corrections	  are	  successful,	  politicians	  suffer	  consequences	  for	  making	  false	  claims.	  This	  finding	  provides	  a	  key	  counterweight	  to	  the	  incentive	  posed	  by	  belief	  echoes	  for	  politicians	  to	  make	  unfounded	  accusations.	  Finally,	  reading	  corrected	  misinformation	  does	  increase	  citizens’	  trust	  in	  media	  more	  generally.	  Insofar	  as	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  political	  reality	  to	  which	  citizens—regardless	  of	  party—should	  be	  able	  to	  refer	  in	  forming	  opinions,	  this	  reality	  will	  necessarily	  be	  experienced	  through	  media.	  The	  more	  that	  citizens	  are	  able	  to	  trust	  that	  they	  are	  being	  shown	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  they	  will	  be	  invested,	  functioning,	  democratic	  participants.	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Appendix	  A.	  Article	  Manipulations	  
A1.	  Experiment	  1	  First	  Article	  	  
	  
Kansas Congressional Race Heats Up 
 
By Samuel Cullen, Kansas City Star 
 
WICHITA, KS. — For Kansas [Republicans/Democrats], 
November's Congressional election is a must-win. But the 
race is far from decided, and [Republican/Democratic] 
hopeful John McKenna is working hard to win over Wichita 
voters. 
 
 McKenna, the former mayor of Wichita and 
[Republican/Democratic] candidate for Congress, gave an 
impassioned speech on Tuesday evening, promising to 
“bring back the American dream” for Kansas residents. 
 
[Misinformation condition] However, McKenna’s 
campaign may be hurt by a relationship that has only 
recently come to light. New statewide campaign finance 
requirements forced McKenna to release the full list of 
contributors to his mayoral campaign.  
Records show that McKenna received several substantial 
donations from convicted felon Daniel Elsio, who formerly headed up the largest organized crime syndicate 
in Kansas. Many hold Elsio responsible for a 51% increase in crystal meth use in Kansas schools between 
2000 and 2005. Elsio was convicted in 2006 of narcotics trafficking and second-degree murder. Records 
show that Elsio also attended several [Republican/Democratic] party fundraisers. 
 
At his speech on Tuesday, McKenna was accompanied by his wife Karen as well as his cousin, film actor 
Robert Downey, Jr. Downey, star of the upcoming movie "The Avengers," spoke briefly about his and 
McKenna’s childhood: “When we were younger, my parents always asked why I couldn’t be more like 
John. They’re still asking.” 
 
McKenna’s speech was followed immediately by a $500-a-head fundraising dinner held at the Auberge 
Hotel in downtown Wichita. 
 
 McKenna, 48, has a law degree from the University of Kansas and practiced law for ten years in a private 
firm. He served as Wichita’s mayor from 2002 to 2008. 
 
 McKenna’s competition in November is local businessman and long-time [Republican/Democratic] 
activist Eric Hall, who has never held office in Kansas. A debate between the two candidates has been 
scheduled for next Friday, to be held at the Lions Club in downtown Wichita. The debate will be broadcast 
on KPTS Channel 8. 
	  
[Republican/Democrat] John McKenna 
spoke to supporters on Tuesday. He was 






A2.	  Experiment	  1	  Second	  Article	  	  
	  
Congressional Candidates Clash Over Education 
 
By Samuel Cullen, Kansas City Star 
 
WICHITA, KS - The two candidates competing in the 4th District’s open seat aired their differences about 
education policies at a debate held on Friday at the Lions Club in downtown Wichita. 
 
[Republican/Democrat] John McKenna and [Democrat/Republican] Eric Hall spent over two hours 
answering questions about their personal histories and policy positions. The debate featured questions 
submitted by viewers as well as questions from the moderator. 
  
Several viewer questions concerned the Kansas public school system. Over the past year, Kansas has been 
forced to substantially cut school budgets, even as test scores across the state have plummeted. Both 
candidates agreed that the current situation is unsustainable, but disagreed on what should be done. 
McKenna, who served as Wichita’s mayor from 2002 until 2010, says he believes that a focus on the basics 
is important: 
  
“Reading, writing, arithmetic. Not that much has changed in the last fifty years, and we need to make sure 
that our kids are getting the basic skills they need before they move on to the next level.” 
  
Hall, on the other hand, stressed the importance of frequent testing to pinpoint problems: 
  
“We can’t fix it unless we know where it’s broken. We should be testing along the way to ensure that kids 
are learning what they should be learning.” 
  
Both candidates also discussed their personal histories. McKenna, a [Republican/Democrat], focused on the 
successful policies he implemented while mayor. Hall, a [Republican/Democrat], discussed his experience 
starting and growing a small business in Wichita. 
 
A telephone poll of 200 likely voters conducted prior to the debate shows that McKenna is leading among 
Democrats and Hall among Republicans. However, many voters (including 76% of Independents) remain 
undecided.  
  
[Correction condition] Correction: Regarding the candidates’ biographies, an article published in the 
Kansas City Star last week stated that Daniel Elsio, a felon convicted of drug trafficking and murder, was a 
frequent donor to John McKenna’s mayoral campaign and attended several Democratic party fundraisers. 
However, further investigation of the campaign donation records has shown that the donor listed was 
actually Daniel Elio, the owner of a local car dealership. 




A3.	  Article	  text	  used	  for	  Experiments	  2,	  4,	  and	  5	  	  	  The	  following	  text	  comprises	  the	  basic	  article	  text	  used	  in	  Experiments	  2,	  4,	  and	  5.	  Any	  variations	  on	  this	  format	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  design	  sections	  for	  the	  individual	  experiments	  (for	  example,	  Experiment	  5	  varies	  the	  source	  of	  the	  correction).	  	  	  
  
 
Iowa Congressional Race Heats Up 
 
by Samuel Cullen, Iowa Ledger 
 
For Iowa Republicans, November's Congressional 
election is a must-win. But the race is far from decided, 
and [Democratic/Republican] hopeful John McKenna is 
working hard to win over Iowa voters. 
 
McKenna, the former mayor of Cedar Rapids and 
[Democratic/Republican] candidate for Congress, gave an 
impassioned speech on Tuesday evening, promising to 
“bring back the American dream” for Iowa residents. 
McKenna previously served as the mayor of Cedar 
Rapids. 
 
At his speech, McKenna was accompanied by his cousin, 
film actor Robert Downey, Jr. 
  
Downey, star of the recent movie “The Avengers,” spoke 
briefly about his and McKenna’s childhood: “When we 
were younger, my parents always asked why I couldn’t be 
more like John. They’re still asking.” 
 
McKenna’s speech was followed immediately by a $500-a-head fundraising dinner held at the Auberge 
Hotel in downtown Cedar Rapids. The dinner was attended by several prominent Iowa 
[Democrats/Republicans]. 
  
McKenna’s competition in November is local businessman and long-time [Democratic/Republican] activist 
Eric Hall, who has never held office in Iowa. Hall has the full support of the Iowa [Democratic/Republican] 
party and has already begun running television ads.  
 
[Misinformation condition] The campaign has heated up in recent weeks. On Sunday, Hall accused 
McKenna of accepting campaign donations from a convicted felon named Daniel Elsio. Elsio, who ran the 
largest drug ring in Iowa while McKenna was mayor, was convicted of first-degree murder in 2010. 
According to Hall, McKenna accepted over $10,000 from Elsio. Hall commented that “McKenna’s corrupt 
behavior shows that he and other [Democrats/Republicans] can’t be trusted to do what's best for Iowa 
citizens.”  
 
[Correction condition] However, further investigation of the campaign donation records by journalists at 
the Iowa Ledger has shown no record of any donation from Elsio to McKenna’s campaign. Campaigns are 
required to disclose the names of all individuals who contribute $200 or more in an election cycle, and 
the Ledger did not find Elsio's name listed. 
 
Democrat/Republican John McKenna 
spoke to supporters Tuesday. He was 






This race is attracting national attention, as Iowa is a critical swing state for the Presidential election. Mitt 
Romney and Barack Obama both plan to visit Cedar Rapids in the coming months. 
 
McKenna, the [Democratic/Republican] candidate, and Hall, the [Democratic/Republican] candidate, will 
debate next Friday. The debate will be held at the Lions Club in downtown Cedar Rapids and be broadcast 
on Channel 8, WQPT. 	  	  
A4.	  Experiment	  3	  candidate	  background	  information	  	  The	  party	  affiliation	  of	  the	  candidate	  varied	  depending	  on	  the	  party	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  the	  condition	  to	  which	  she	  was	  opposed	  (same-­‐party	  or	  opposing-­‐party)	  	  




A5.	  Experiment	  3	  Headlines	  and	  Photos	  	  All	  headlines	  and	  photos	  were	  in	  the	  format	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.2	  (featuring	  the	  Nevada	  Tribune	  headline	  and	  blurred	  text	  next	  to	  the	  photo	  and	  below	  the	  headline).	  	  	  	  
Article	   Headline/subhead	   Photo	  Article	  1	  (all	  subjects)	   Nevada	  Congressional	  Race	  Heats	  Up	  Voters	  report	  more	  mailings,	  phone	  
calls,	  and	  visits	  as	  election	  nears	  
	  Article	  2	  (all	  subjects)	   [Democrat/Republican]	  Mitchell,	  [Republican/Democrat]	  Ross	  to	  Face	  Off	  
Economy	  and	  health	  care	  will	  be	  the	  
focus	  of	  Friday’s	  debate	  
	  Article	  3A	  (Misinfo	  1	  group)	   Felon	  Donation	  Scandal	  Hits	  Mitchell	  Campaign	  Ross	  accuses	  Mitchell	  of	  accepting	  
campaign	  donations	  from	  convicted	  
felon	  Joe	  Fenz	  
	  Article	  3B	  (Misinfo	  2	  group)	   Past	  Policies	  Return	  to	  Haunt	  Mitchell	  Campaign	  Ross	  says	  Mitchell’s	  health	  care	  
reforms	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  




Article	  3C	  (Misinfo	  3	  group)	   Corruption	  Scandal	  Hits	  Mitchell	  Campaign	  Ross	  accuses	  Mitchell	  of	  spending	  
$294,000	  of	  taxpayer	  money	  to	  
finance	  three	  family	  vacations	  to	  the	  
Florida	  coast	  
	  Article	  4	  	  (Correction	  1	  group)	   Mitchell’s	  Donation	  Records	  Show	  No	  Felon	  Donations	  A	  Nevada	  Tribune	  investigation	  of	  Mitchell’s	  finances	  found	  no	  record	  of	  donations	  from	  
convicted	  felon	  Joe	  Fenz	  
	  Article	  4	  (Correction	  2	  group)	   Newborn	  Deaths	  in	  Nevada	  Did	  Not	  Increase	  Under	  Mitchell’s	  Hospital	  Reforms	  A	  Nevada	  Tribune	  investigation	  of	  hospital	  
records	  shows	  no	  rise	  in	  infant	  mortality	  in	  
Nevada	  hospitals	  since	  Mitchell’s	  policies	  
were	  implemented	   	  Article	  4	  (Correction	  3	  group)	   Mitchell’s	  Vacation	  not	  Paid	  	  for	  with	  Taxpayer	  Money	  A	  Nevada	  Tribune	  investigation	  of	  Mitchell’s	  finance	  reports	  shows	  he	  did	  not	  use	  public	  
funds	  to	  pay	  for	  his	  vacations	  
	  Article	  5	   Mitchell	  Holds	  Fundraiser	  in	  Carson	  City	  Local	  [Democratic/Republican]	  leaders	  pay	  $450	  a	  head	  for	  dinner	  with	  the	  congressional	  candidate	  




Appendix	  B.	  Question	  Wording	  	  
B1.	  Demographic	  battery	  	  
What is your age? 
 
m 18 - 25 
m 26 - 40 
m 41 - 55 
m 56 or older 
 
 
What is the last grade or class you completed in school? 
 
m Did not finish high school 
m High school diploma or equivalent, no further schooling 
m Technical or vocational school after high school 
m Some college, no degree 
m Associate's or two-year college degree 
m Four-year college degree 
m Graduate or professional school after college, no degree 











In general, do you disagree or agree with the following statements? 
 
 Disagree Agree 
You can generally trust 
the people who run our 
government to do what is 
right. 
m  m  
When government 
leaders make statements 
to the American people, 
they are usually telling 
the truth. 
m  m  
The people we have 
elected to public office 
usually try to keep the 
promises they have 
made. 





How interested are you in politics and public affairs? 
 
m Very interested 
m Somewhat interested 
m Slightly interested 
m Not at all interested 
 





m Another party 
m No preference 
 
 
Would you call yourself a strong ${q://QID5/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} or a 
not so strong ${q://QID5/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}? 
 
m Strong ${q://QID5/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} 
m Not so strong ${q://QID5/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} 
 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic party or the Republican 
party? 
 
m The Democratic Party 
m The Republican Party 
m Neither party 
 
Do you usually think of yourself as: 
 
m Extremely liberal 
m Liberal 
m Slightly liberal 
m Slightly conservative 
m Conservative 
m Very conservative 
 




B2.	  Attitude	  Elicitation	  	  The	  following	  questions	  comprise	  the	  basic	  attitude	  elicitation	  battery	  used	  in	  each	  of	  the	  experiments.	  Any	  variations	  on	  this	  format	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  design	  sections	  for	  the	  individual	  experiments.	  	  
 
 
Please rate both the candidates you read about on the thermometer below. The 
thermometer runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel 
favorable and warm toward the person. Rating below 50 means that you feel 
unfavorable and cool toward the person. 
	  








Eric Hall is a 
high-quality 
candidate. 
m  m  m  m  m  
John 
McKenna 
would make a 
good 
representative. 
m  m  m  m  m  
John 
McKenna may 
not be suited 
for public 
office. 






For each of the following phrases, please indicate how well that phrase applies to 
Congressional candidate John McKenna. [Respondents completed same for Eric 
Hall] 
	  
If you had to guess, which candidate do you think was more successful at 
recruiting volunteers for his campaign? 
 
m John McKenna 
m Both candidates were equally successful 
m Eric Hall 
 
 
In general, how much do you think each of the candidates appeals to 
Independent voters  (in other words, voters who are not affiliated with either the 






If you had to guess, who do you think won the election in November? Just give 
your best guess based on what you've read. 
 
m John McKenna definitely won. 
m John McKenna probably won. 
m Eric Hall probably won. 
m Eric Hall definitely won. 	  
B3.	  Media	  Evaluation	  For	  each	  media	  outlet,	  subjects	  were	  shown	  the	  following	  three	  questions	  on	  a	  single	  page.	  At	  the	  top	  of	  the	  page	  was	  a	  logo	  from	  the	  outlet	  under	  consideration.	  The	  three	  questions	  below	  concern	  GetTheFacts.org	  (the	  logo	  was	  constructed	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  survey).	  	  
The following questions are about the fact-checking organization 
GetTheFacts.org.              
 
In your opinion, do you think that GetTheFacts.org tends to favor one political 
party over the other when it fact-checks stories? 
 
m Strongly favors the Democrats 
m Weakly favors the Democrats 
m Neutral/unbiased/not sure 
m Weakly favors the Republicans 
m Strongly favors the Republicans 
 






How much of the time do you think you can trust GetTheFacts.org to get the facts 
right? 
 
m Just about always 
m Most of the time 
m Only some of the time 
m Almost never 
 	  
Appendix	  C.	  Distractor	  Task	  











When	  the	  120	  seconds	  was	  up	  (or	  when	  subjects	  clicked	  the	  “next”	  button),	  they	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  answers	  below.	  	  	  




Appendix	  D.	  Demographics	  	  	  
D1.	  Demographics	  for	  Experiment	  1	  and	  Experiment	  2	  	  




 Freq Percent Frequ Percent 
18 - 25 49 31.2 164 33.8 
26 - 40 69 43.9 210 43.3 
41 - 55 30 19.1 78 16.1 
56 or older 9 5.7 31 6.4 
Female 82 52.2 286 59 
Did not finish high school 12 7.6 5 1 
High school diploma or equivalent, 
no further schooling 
12 7.6 54 11.1 
Technical or vocational school 
after high school 
7 4.5 14 2.9 
Some college, no degree 37 23.6 147 30.3 
Associate's or two-year college 
degree 
21 13.4 58 12 
Four-year college degree 50 31.8 136 28 
Graduate or professional school 
after college, no degree 
9 5.7 30 6.2 
Graduate or professional degree 21 13.4 41 8.5 
Republican 30 19.1 72 14.8 
Democrat 49 31.2 192 39.6 
Independent 50 31.8 141 29.1 
Another party 8 5.1 16 3.3 
No preference 20 12.7 64 13.2 
Very interested 48 30.6 103 21.2 
Somewhat interested 55 35 202 41.6 
Slightly interested 42 26.8 131 27 




D2.	  Demographics	  for	  Experiments	  3,	  4,	  and	  5	  Note	  that	  Experiment	  5	  shares	  474	  subjects	  with	  Experiment	  2.	  	  Some	  demographic	  questions	  were	  not	  asked	  in	  Experiment	  3	  for	  reasons	  of	  time	  	  






 Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent 
18 - 25 60 33.7 86 34.3 209 34.5 
26 - 40 87 48.9 113 45 263 43.4 
41 - 55 24 13.5 40 15.9 93 15.3 
56 or older 7 3.9 12 4.8 39 6.4 
Female 88 49.4 135 53.8 358 59.1 
Did not finish high school N/A N/A 1 0.4 7 1.2 
High school diploma or 
equivalent, no further 
schooling 
N/A N/A 44 17.5 69 11.4 
Technical or vocational 
school after high school 
N/A N/A 9 3.6 17 2.8 
Some college, no degree N/A N/A 80 31.9 179 29.5 
Associate's or two-year 
college degree 
N/A N/A 29 11.6 64 10.6 
Four-year college degree N/A N/A 57 22.7 180 29.7 
Graduate or professional 
school after college, no 
degree 
N/A N/A 5 2 34 5.6 
Graduate or professional 
degree 
N/A N/A 26 10.4 56 9.2 
Republican 25 14 51 20.3 98 16.2 
Democrat 82 46.1 114 45.4 232 38.3 
Independent 58 32.6 61 24.3 175 28.9 
Another party 4 2.2 8 3.2 20 3.3 
No preference 9 5.1 17 6.8 81 13.4 
Very interested N/A N/A 59 23.5 131 21.6 
Somewhat interested N/A N/A 121 48.2 238 39.3 
Slightly interested N/A N/A 55 21.9 172 28.4 
Not at all interested N/A N/A 16 6.4 65 10.7 	  





E1.	  Full	  list	  of	  experiments	  	  	  	  
Name Pretest 1 (not in dissertation) 
Date August 2011 
Design 300 participants, between-subjects, 3 (types of misinformation) x 
2 (corrected and uncorrected) plus a control group.  
Goals 1) To determine the impact of three types of candidate 
misinformation (cheating in law school, accepting illegal 
campaign donations, and soliciting a prostitute) on attitudes 
towards that candidate. 
2) To determine whether misinformation can be successfully 
corrected.  
3) To determine whether belief echoes are created when no 
party cues are present. 
Findings 1) Each type of misinformation was equally effective at lowering 
evaluations (no significant difference between the three) 
2) Misinformation can be successfully corrected. 




Name Pretest 2 (not in dissertation) 
Date November 2011 
Design 685 participants, between-subjects, 3 conditions (corrected 
misinfo, no misinfo, control). For all participants, the article 
concerned a candidate of the opposite party (Independents were 
forced to identify a lean). Correction was in a separate article than 
the misinformation, separated by a distractor task.  
Goals 1) Test for the existence of belief echoes in the presence of party 
cues: those who receive corrected negative misinformation 
should evaluate the candidate more negatively than those who 
receive no misinformation or correction. 
Findings 1) Belief echoes exist: even though the misinformation was 
successfully corrected, exposure to the misinformation 
continues to affect attitudes. 
 
  
Name Effect of time delay on belief echoes (some data used for 
Experiment 2) 




Design 800 participants, between-subjects 2 (article 1 misinformation, 
article 1 no misinformation) x 2 (article 2 correction, article 2 no 
correction) x 2 (time delay of up to 1 week between article 1 and 
article 2, no time delay) 
Goals 1) Test for the existence of belief echoes (replicate findings in 
Pretest 2) 
2) Does increasing the length of time between misinformation 
and correction magnify belief echoes? 
3) Do belief echoes persist over time? 
Findings 1) Belief echoes exist: again, even though the misinformation 
was successfully corrected, exposure to the misinformation 
continues to affect attitudes. 
2)  Imposing a time delay between the first article (with the 
misinformation) and the second article (with the correction) 
does not increase or decrease the magnitude of belief echoes.  
3) Participants contacted 5 – 7 days after reading the initial 
misinfo and correction continue to evaluate the candidate 
more negatively: belief echoes persist.  
  
Name Correction Effects (data used for Experiments 1 and 5) 
Date June 2012 
Design 640 participants, between-subjects 2 (candidate is same party, 
candidate is opposing party) x 5 (corrected by fact-checking org, 
corrected by opposing party, corrected by media outlet, 
uncorrected misinformation, no misinformation)  
Goals 1) Determine which correction is most effective at reducing belief 
in misinformation. 
2) Determine whether partisanship affects the size of belief 
echoes: are they stronger when misinformation reinforces pre-
existing partisan loyalties? 
3)  Measure the effect of publishing corrected misinformation on 
media trust more generally as well as trust in the specific 
media outlet that published the correction. 
Findings 1) Corrections issued by a fact-checking organization or a 
newspaper are significantly more effective than those issued 
by the campaign itself, even when the content is identical. 
2) Belief echoes are of a similar magnitude regardless of the 
party of the candidate.  
3) Reading corrections increases trust in media more generally 




correction only if the correction contradicts pre-existing 
partisan preferences. 
  
Name Affirmation test (data used for Experiment 3) 
Date October 2012 
Design 300 participants, 2 (candidate is same party, candidate is 
opposing party) x 2 (affirmation or negation)  
Goal 1) To determine whether corrections in the form of affirmations 
are more effective than corrections in the form of negations at 
muting belief echoes. 
2) To determine whether in a situation of high cognitive 
processing, belief echoes will only be created among those 
predisposed to dislike the candidate 
Findings 1) Affirmations and negations were equally successful at muting 
belief echoes. 
2) High cognitive processing does magnify belief echoes for 
those predisposed to dislike the candidate. 
  
Experiment Recall task (data used for Experiment 4) 
Date November 2012 
Design 250 participants, 2 (candidate is same party, candidate is 
opposing party) x 3 (corrected misinformation, uncorrected 
misinformation, no misinformation) x 2 (completed recall task, did 
not complete recall task) 
Goal 1) To determine whether actively recalling the misinformation 
and correction creates cognitive belief echoes (among those 
who are predisposed to dislike the candidate) 
2) To investigate the responses to open-ended questions. 
Findings 1) Recall task heightens belief echoes among those predisposed 
to dislike the candidate. In contrast, among those who did not 
complete the recall task, belief echoes are the same 
magnitude regardless of partisanship. 
2) Open-ended responses show evidence for cognitive belief 
echoes.  	  
